The New Commerce Clause Doctrine
in Game Theoretical Perspective
Maxwell L. Stearns∗
Abstract
The Roberts Court emerges at a critical juncture in the development of Commerce Clause
doctrine. While the Commerce Clause doctrine implicates concerns for federalism and separation
of powers, both of which are rooted in the earliest part of our constitutional history, the new Court
presents an ideal opportunity to critically assess existing doctrines and to develop new analytical
paradigms. The Rehnquist Court succeeded for the first time in sixty years in imposing substantive
limits on the scope of this important source of Congressional power. That Court proved far less
successful, however, in developing a coherent normative theory that reconciles the new doctrinal
limitations with the traditional broad scope of the post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases. This
Article’s new game theoretical analysis satisfies these objectives by offering a compelling
normative account of Commerce Clause doctrine and a framework for applying the new
methodology to actual cases.
The Rehnquist Court announced the new Commerce Clause doctrine in the 1995 decision,
Lopez v. United States, which struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The Lopez Court
changed the longstanding test governing the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, set
out in the infamous 1942 case, Wickard v. Filburn. While prior cases had used “economic” to
qualify the effects that the underlying regulated activity had on commerce, the Lopez Court
instead used economic to qualify the activity itself. In the 2000 decision, Morrison v. United
States, the Court applied the non-economic activities test to strike down the civil remedies
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act despite extensive Congressional findings. Most
recently, in the 2005 case, Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court applied this test to sustain the
Controlled Substances Act’s complete ban on private use of marijuana, as applied to two women
who had cultivated or otherwise acquired marijuana for the treatment of severe pain pursuant to
the California Compassionate Use Act, despite the apparent local nature of the regulated activity.
Notably, the Raich Court produced four separate opinions, none of which offered a satisfying
framework that reconciles the expansive post-New Deal Commerce Clause precedents with the
recent retrenchments represented in Lopez and Morrison.
This Article traces the Lopez Court’s doctrinal modification, explores its implications, and
offers an alternative game theoretical analysis that considers the need for a central coordinating
authority to effectuate the Congressional policy enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Drawing upon the prisoners’ dilemma and the multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining game, this
Article grounds the larger goals of the Commerce Clause doctrine in an effort to ensure that
Congress has the necessary regulatory authority with which to implement desired policies
substantially affecting interstate commerce that states, acting in their individual capacities, would
either be unable to implement or would be prone to obstruct. The analysis reconciles the
expansive post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases with the more recent retrenchments, embodied
in Lopez and in Morrison.
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While this Article will offer a critical assessment of the Lopez non-economic activities test and
of the application of that test in Raich, its larger objective is consistent with the doctrine’s goals
as expressed by now-retired Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The goal of Commerce
Clause doctrine is to allow Congress to “regulate more than nothing . . . but less than
everything.” Satisfying these objectives is essential to preserving the integrity of our federal
constitutional system which, in contrast with its state counterparts, rests upon the concept of
delegated rather than plenary powers. This Article’s analysis, which uses game theory to satisfy
these goals, should have broad appeal to members of the Roberts Court.
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The panel’s approach in this case leads to the result that regulating the
taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in
California constitutes regulating “Commerce . . . among the several
States.” 1
Was United States v. Lopez a constitutional freak? Or did it signify that the
Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits on congressional
power?2

Introduction
The Roberts Court emerges at a critical juncture in the development of Commerce Clause
doctrine. While the Commerce Clause doctrine implicates concerns for federalism and separation
of powers, both of which are rooted in the earliest part of our constitutional history, the new Court
presents an ideal opportunity to critically assess existing doctrines and to develop new analytical
paradigms. An analysis of the Commerce Clause Doctrine reveals that while the Rehnquist Court
succeeded for the first time in sixty years in imposing substantive limits on the scope of this
important source of Congressional power,3 the Court was far less successful in developing a
coherent normative theory that reconciled its new doctrinal limitations with the traditional broad
scope of the post New Deal Commerce Clause cases.4 This Article’s new game theoretical
approach achieves these objectives by offering a compelling normative account of Commerce
Clause doctrine and a framework for applying the new methodology to actual cases.
In the confirmation hearings for both John Roberts and Samuel Alito, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee Arlen Specter expressed concern that the Supreme Court’s new Commerce
Clause Doctrine, first articulated in Lopez v. United States,5 and later applied in Morrison v.
United States,6 demonstrated disrespect for Congress and for its fact finding processes.7 In Lopez,8
1

Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for rehearing en banc) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3).
2
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
3
See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995 as
exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce clause power); see also Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(striking civil remedies provisions of the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding the scope of Congress’s
commerce clause power).
4
See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (sustaining the application of the Controlled Substances Act against
the California Compassionate Use Act, thus disallowing physician prescribed medical marijuana as permitted under
state law). For a critical analysis of the four approaches offered in separate opinions to the Commerce Clause in Raich,
see infra part I.
5
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearings](Statement of
Senator Arlen Specter, September 12, 2005) (“When the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a portion of
the legislation to protect women against violence, the Court did so because of our "method of reasoning." And the
dissent noted that that had carried the implication of judicial competence. And the inverse of that is congressional
incompetence.”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (forthcoming) ([hereinafter Alito Hearings]
(Statement of Arlen Specter) (“In declaring unconstitutional legislation designed to protect women against violence,
the Supreme Court did so notwithstanding a voluminous record in support of that legislation, but because of
Congress’, “method of reasoning”; rather insulting to suggest that there is some superior method of reasoning in the
court.”)
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then Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority, struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
which had made it a federal crime to use or possess a gun within 1000 feet of a public school. The
Lopez Court changed the formulation of a longstanding test governing the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers, attributable to the infamous case, Wickard v. Filburn.9 While prior
cases had used “economic” to qualify the effects that the underlying regulated activity had on
commerce,10 the new Commerce Clause Doctrine used economic to qualify the activity itself.11
The Commerce Clause has long been a source of contention between liberal and conservative
jurists in large part because the commerce power is broader in reach than virtually any other
delegated Congressional power.12 The Tenth Amendment notwithstanding,13 Congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause has highlighted the tension between a model of limited and
delegated federal powers on the one hand and presumed or plenary police state powers on the
other. Using the newly devised non-economic activities test, Rehnquist was able to cabin
longstanding and expansive Commerce Clause cases into a neatly defined, and seemingly limited,
category,14 thus restoring at least the appearance of limited Congressional regulatory powers.
By devising a new Commerce Clause Doctrine in the important “substantial effects” category,
the Lopez Court was able, for the first time in over sixty years, to strike down an exercise of
Congressional Commerce Clause power based upon the subject matter of the underlying
regulation. Most importantly, it did so while claiming to reconcile Wickard, widely regarded as the
Supreme Court’s most far reaching Commerce Clause case.15 Five years later, in Morrison v.
United States,16 the Court then struck down the civil remedies provision for violent gender-related
crimes in the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”),17 as exceeding the permissible scope of
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.18 While many viewed Lopez as symbolic—the opinion
itself suggested that including a jurisdictional provision linking the relevant gun to commerce
might satisfy the new test19—Morrison demonstrated that more was at stake. No simple
jurisdictional fix could remedy the claimed difficulty that VAWA’s civil remedies provisions
8

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
10
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (“But even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce . . . .”)
11
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.”).
12
For a debate on the proper scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (arguing that taking the logic of the substantial effects cases to its logical extreme would result in
conferring police powers, rather than limited delegated powers, upon Congress), with id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority’s restrictive understanding of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and producing an Appendix
that lists a broad range of federal statutes potentially affected by the newly articulated non-economic activities test.).
13
See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
14
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 (claiming that articulated test includes even the most expansive Supreme Court
precedents sustaining Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
15
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone
does not.”).
16
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
17
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
18
For a description of the Morrison facts, see infra note 286.
19
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (“Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.”).
9
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appeared to render a traditional matter of state criminal law the basis for a new federal civil
damages action.20
The Supreme Court’s most recent Commerce Clause case, Gonzales v. Raich,21 which sustained
a seemingly far reaching exercise of Congressional Commerce Clause power in the substantial
effects category, further demonstrated that the Lopez Court’s seemingly modest change in
doctrinal formulation may have produced an important, if unintended,22 consequence. In Gonzales,
the Supreme Court sustained an application of the federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 to
ban the cultivation, acquisition, and use of medical marijuana, with a physician’s prescription, as
permitted under the California Compassionate Use Act.23 For the Raich majority, the justification
grew out of a straightforward application of the newly minted substantial effects test.
“Economics,” now used to modify the activities Congress can regulate, rather than the relationship
between the regulated activity and commerce, includes the study of production, and growing
marijuana is an act of production.24
While Rehnquist had employed the non-economic activities test to impose new limits on the
scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, Justice Stevens, writing for the Raich majority,
applied the test in a manner that was more obviously intended to restore the doctrine’s earlier
breadth.25 The Raich Court set out to restore Wickard v. Filburn,26 the centerpiece of the post-New
Deal Court’s expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, notwithstanding that at least nominally,
under Lopez and Morrison, Wickard remained good law.27
The Wickard Court sustained an application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which
allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to set production quotas on wheat during an international
wheat glut in an effort to bolster prices, to Filburn, a small farmer, even though the government
stipulated that he had used the above-quota portion entirely on his own farm.28 In an excessively
quoted portion of his opinion for the unanimous Wickard Court, Justice Robert Jackson explained,
in essence, that while Filburn’s activity was entirely local, if everybody engaged in it, the activity
would then become national.29

20

For a more detailed discussion of Morrison, see infra part III.B.3.
125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
22
The Chief Justice demonstrated, for example, that he did not intend his newly articulated non-economic activities
test to condone a Congressional ban on state-approved, physician-prescribed medical marijuana, by joining the
principal dissent in Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
23
See id. at 2201 (“The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this case.”)
24
125 S. Ct. at 2211 (noting that “‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities,’” and sustaining application of CSA to Respondents’ activities on the ground that “The CSA . . .
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and
lucrative, interstate market.”).
25
Justice Stevens was joined by the liberal Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and by the centrist conservative
Justice Kennedy. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence in the judgment. See
id. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
26
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27
While Lopez did not overturn Wickard, as stated above, see supra notes 10, 11, and 15, and accompanying text, it
did alter the wording of the Wickard substantial effects test.
28
See id.
29
See id. at 127-28 (asserting “[t]hat appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is
not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”).
21
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While jurists and scholars have ridiculed Wickard, claiming that it has no stopping point,30 read
in context, Jackson’s argument was substantially more measured.31 Fairly read, Jackson’s opinion
demonstrates that federal regulatory intervention was necessary to solve a peculiar coordination
problem associated with wheat production: Rational farmers, and states, could be expected to
undermine any agreed upon beneficial pricing scheme intended to extricate growers from the
difficulties associated with the international wheat glut.
The Raich Court did not offer any satisfactory theory that reconciled the post-New Deal
Commerce Clause expansion with the more recent doctrinal retrenchments represented by Lopez
and Morrison. Rather than inquiring whether a coordination difficulty similar to that in Wickard or
other post-New Deal cases appeared on the facts of Raich that would justify imposing a federal
regulatory ban on state-sanctioned medical marijuana, Justice Stevens instead applied the literal
definition of economics to find that the growth and distribution of marijuana qualifies as a
regulable market activity.32 Ironically, under this reading of Lopez, the act of production, which in
an earlier, and more formalistic, generation of Commerce Clause cases represented the principal
limitation on the scope of Congress’s Commerce power,33 suddenly provides an independent basis
for Congressional regulatory authority.
The discussions about the Commerce Clause in the two recent Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings were no more successful in suggesting a coherent framework for applying the new
commerce clause doctrine. John Roberts assured Senator Specter that the federal judiciary was
obligated to respect Congress and its fact finding processes.34 At the same time, however, Roberts
defended his dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,35 a case
in which a panel rejected a constitutional challenge to applying the Endangered Species Act to
prevent a planned development that threatened the arroyo toad, a listed endangered species
endemic to California,36 as a modest judicial attempt to search for an alternative, less
problematical, ground with which to sustain the federal regulation.37 Similarly, while Sam Alito
flatly rejected the suggestion that federal jurists exhibit superior reasoning to members of
Congress,38 he defended his dissent in United States v. Rybar,39 a case that sustained a conviction
30

See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring).
For a more detailed discussion of Wickard, see infra part II.A.
32
Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210 (2005).
33
For a more detailed discussion, with citations, see infra note 98, and accompanying text.
34
Roberts Hearings, supra note 7, at 300 (statement of Judge Roberts responding to Senator Specter) (“[W]ith respect
to review of congressional findings . . . my view of the appropriate role of a judge is a limited role and that you do not
make the law . . . .”).
35
323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
36
See id. at 1080.
37
Roberts also explained in both his dissent and in the hearings that the case was problematic in that the panel had at
least implicitly sustained the regulation on the ground that the overall regulatory scheme, rather than the regulated
activity itself, substantially affected commerce. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 7, at 226 (statement of John Roberts
in response to question by Senator Feinstein, September 13, 2005) (“Well, the opinion I wrote there noted that the
panel decision that I thought should be reheard en banc looked at one ground for under the Commerce Clause, and the
concluding paragraph in my opinion said that we ought to rehear the case to look at other grounds that were also under
the Commerce Clause, but they were not the particular prong of the Commerce Clause analysis that the panel opinion
had relied on . . . .”); see also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). For an analysis that compares this to Justice Scalia’s analysis in Raich, see infra note 124, and
accompanying text, and for a more detailed analysis of Rancho Viejo, see infra notes 196-198, and accompanying text.
38
Alito Hearings, supra note 7 (statement of Samuel Alito responding to questioning by Senator Spector) (“I would
never suggest that judges have superior reasoning power than does Congress.”).
39
103 F.3d 273, 286 (3rd Cir. 1996).
31
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for possession and distribution of machine guns, on the ground that the statute failed to include a
simple jurisdictional provision linking the gun to interstate commerce.40
Current Supreme Court case law and the recent Senate judiciary committee hearings clearly
demonstrate the need for critical new thinking on the Commerce Clause.41 Using basic insights
from game theory, this article fills this void by offering a new analytical framework. That
framework reconciles two sets of insights that remain in tension. First, the post New Deal
Commerce Clause doctrine reveals the inherent difficulties in limiting the scope of federal
Commerce Clause powers based upon simple tests that demarcate the proper allocation of
authority between the states and the federal government. Second, the new Commerce Clause
doctrine reflects the concern that taken to its logical extreme, Wickard’s multiplier analysis risks
transforming Commerce Clause doctrine from a specific, if broad, delegation of power to
Congress into the equivalent of plenary police powers operating on a national scale. While this
Article offers a means of reconciling the expansive post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases with
Lopez and Morrison, its goals are appreciably more ambitious. This Article articulates a
compelling normative account of Commerce Clause doctrine—one that grounds the doctrine in the
need for federal regulation to resolve coordination problems preventing states from furthering
desired regulatory objectives on their own—and offers a framework for implementing that
normative policy in actual cases.
To present the Commerce Clause doctrine, this article begins with Raich, not only because it is
the most recent Supreme Court decision,42 but also because it provides four separate opinions,
each offering an alternative method of framing Commerce Clause doctrine in the critical
substantial effects category. The Raich opinions also provide a ready means through which to
present the most important Supreme Court cases, including most notably Wickard, Lopez, and
Morrison. The discussion will demonstrate that while the Court lacks a coherent normative theory
governing the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, a majority of the Rehnquist Court,
and one that is likely to carry over to the Roberts Court, appears committed both to continuing the
Lopez project while maintaining the major post-New Deal Commerce cases. To reconcile these
intuitions, this Article will rely upon two simple coordination games, first the prisoners’ dilemma,
and second, the multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining game.
The prisoners’ dilemma analysis will show the circumstances in which, absent federal
regulatory intervention, individual firms or states are motivated to thwart the objectives of three
40

Of course including such a provision would move both Rybar and Lopez from the difficult “substantial effects”
category of Congress’s commerce power to the far less controversial category involving the regulation of persons or
things traveling in interstate commerce. See infra part III.A (discussing case category).
41
Notably, one paper symposium was dedicated to the Supreme Court’s most recent decision, Gonzales v. Raich, 125
S. Ct. 2195 (2005), see 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743 (2005) (paper symposium with contributions by Randy Barnett,
Jonathan Adler, Ann Althouse, Eric R. Claeys, Thomas Merrill, John Parry, Robert Pushaw, Jr., and Glenn H.
Reynolds and Brannan P. Denning). While the contributors offer important insights into Commerce Clause doctrine,
including critical assessments of Raich, none offers a comprehensive scheme drawing upon tools of game theory to
reconcile the ambitious post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases with the more recent retrenchments represented in
Lopez and Morrison.
42
While the Court might have used Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), to offer further guidance on the
permissible scope of Congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause, the Court instead limited its holding, that
the Controlled Substances Act did not authorize Attorney General John Ashcroft to interpret the Act to ban physicianassisted suicide in contravention of a Washington law permitting it, to an application of the agency deference rules
established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915.
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identified federal policies, first, centrally coordinated pricing schemes; second, centrally regulated
working conditions; and third, centrally coordinated environmental regulations.43 The multiple
Nash equilibrium game will establish a fourth category, which arises when individual states are
rationally motivated to undermine a desired policy that promotes geographical coordination
among states.
These two game theoretical models, and the four doctrinal categories that they create, are
sufficiently broad to encompass most of the major post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases, not
limited to the substantial effects cases.44 The models also reconcile current doctrine by
demonstrating the absence of any needed federal regulatory coordination in the Lopez and
Morrison cases. While this Article thus reconciles the pre-Raich Commerce Clause cases, it offers
a critical assessment of Raich itself. The analysis demonstrates the absence of any coordination
difficulty justifying the application of the CSA to ban California from facilitating physician
prescribed medical marijuana. Even if readers disagree with this Article’s ultimate conclusion that
Raich represents an improper application of Congressional Commerce Clause power, however,
that is secondary to this Article’s larger mission, namely offering a compelling normative theory
of the Commerce Clause and setting out a comprehensive framework for applying that theory to
actual cases.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the four opinions in Gonzeles v. Raich and
places them in their proper doctrinal context. Part II presents two simple game theoretical models
that together develop four doctrinal categories. Identifying these categories proves essential to
assessing the proper scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. While part II will present
specific cases that help to develop the models, Part III applies the framework developed in part II
to several additional cases including Raich. The Article closes with some comments on the future
scope of Commerce Clause power.

I. The Raich Opinions in Context
In Gonzales v. Raich,45 the federal Controlled Substances Act (the “CSA”),46 which prohibited
all marijuana use except as part of a research project approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”),47 conflicted with the California Compassionate Use Act (“CCUA”).48
Under specified conditions, the CCUA protected patients who suffered specified ailments, and

43

I do not suggest that additional coordination games beyond those listed, which are suggested in the case law, might
not arise. This article does is not to intended to provide an exhaustive list, but rather a flexible, yet comprehensive
framework for analysis.
44
As explained infra part III, while the analysis makes Wickard an easy case justifying the use of Congressional
Commerce Clause power, it raises the question whether the Supreme Court correctly sustained Congress’s exercise of
Commerce Clause power in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
45
125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
46
The Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 100, 84 Stat. 1242, is contained in Title II of The
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203 n.19, and
accompanying text.
47
See id. at 2204 (explaining that “By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, as opposed to putting it on a lesser
schedule, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana became a criminal offense, with the sole exception
being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration pre-approved research study.”).
48
This Act was originally passed by California voters as Proposition 215 in 1996. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11362l5 (West Supp. 2005); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199.
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others for whom marijuana provides relief,49 and their prescribing physicians, from prosecution for
the cultivation, possession, and use of medical marijuana.50
Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson were California residents who suffered serious
illnesses and who, as a result of the failure of traditional medicines and the success of medical
marijuana in treating their symptoms, qualified for eligibility under the CCUA. Both Raich and
Monson had used marijuana under medical supervision “to function on a daily basis.”51 Raich’s
physician had submitted an affidavit attesting that he “believe[d] that forgoing cannabis treatments
would . . . cause Raich excruciating pain and could very well prove fatal.”52
While Monson cultivated her own marijuana, which she ingested by smoking or with a
vaporizer, Raich instead relied upon two caregivers, litigating as John Does, who provided her
locally grown marijuana free of charge.53 In August 2002, county sheriffs and agents from the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) found marijuana in Monson’s home. Although
California law authorized her use of the marijuana, the federal agents nonetheless seized and
destroyed her six cannabis plants.54

A. Lower Court Proceedings
Respondents brought suit against the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the
DEA seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting enforcement of the CSA inasmuch as it
prevented them “from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical
use.”55 While respondents raised a number of constitutional claims,56 based upon the disposition in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Raich Court focused exclusively on
the question whether as applied to respondents’ activities the absolute federal ban on marijuana
was a proper constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.
The district court, which denied respondents’ motion for preliminary injunction, determined that
although the federal interest in a complete ban on medical marijuana “waned” in comparison with
the harm to respondents if their access were discontinued, respondents nonetheless could not
“demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.”57 The Ninth Circuit, which reversed and
ordered the district court to issue a preliminary injunction, split on whether the controlling line of
Supreme Court precedent was the recent retrenchment in Commerce Clause powers set out in
United States v. Lopez,58 and United States v. Morrison,59 or instead, the expansive body of post49

Among the listed ailments for which medical marijuana is deemed appropriate are “cancer, anexoria, AIDS, chronic
pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijana provides relief.” Raich, 125 S.
Ct. at 2199 n.4 (quoting the Compassionate Use Act, now codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11462.5 (West
Supp. 2005)).
50
Justice Stevens explained that “The proposition was designed to ensure that ‘seriously ill’ residents have access to
marijuana for medical purposes, and to encourage Federal and State Governments to take steps towards ensuring the
safe and affordable distribution of the drug to patients in need.” Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199.
51
Id. at 2200.
52
Id.
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
Id.
56
Respondents presented claims under the Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, and the doctrine of medical necessity. See id.
57
Id.
58
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause powers).
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New Deal Commerce Clause cases, including most notably Wickard v. Filburn.60 The majority
determined that recent ninth circuit precedent construing Lopez and Morrison had placed medical
marijuana as a “separate class of purely local activity beyond the reach of federal power.”61 In
contrast, the dissent determined that it was “simply impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct
surrounding the cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at issue in this case from the cultivation
and use of the wheat crop that affected interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn.”62 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.63

B. Justice Stevens’ Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens defined the central issue in Raich as whether “Congress’s power to regulate
interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are
supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally.”64 While expressing sympathy for the
respondents and acknowledging the troubling facts, Stevens ultimately concluded that as applied
to respondents’ activities, “[w]ell-settled law” demonstrates that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of
federal power.”65
Stevens explained that the CSA was enacted as part of President Nixon’s first campaign in the
“war on drugs.”66 Through the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
(the “Comprehensive Drug Act”),67 Congress consolidated various drug laws into a single statute
and reorganized federal drug law administration.68 The Comprehensive Drug Act also
accomplished two further objectives. First, it limited diversion of drugs to illegal channels by
regulating their legitimate sources, and second, it strengthened law enforcement against illegal
drug trafficking.69
The CSA, which contains the marijuana prohibition at issue in Raich, forms Title II of the Act.
Title II establishes a comprehensive regime to fight domestic and international drug trafficking by
controlling both the legitimate and illegitimate market in controlled substances.70 Justice Stevens
explained that among the principal objectives of Title II, which proved significant in Raich, was
preventing the diversion of drugs from legal to illegal channels.71

59

529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act exceeds
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.)
60
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as applied to a local farmer producing
wheat above allotted quota does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause powers).
61
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201.
62
Id. (quoting ninth circuit dissent).
63
This case was not only important to California, but also to at least eight other states, which had enacted similar
compassionate use laws governing medical marijuana. See id. at 2198.
64
Id. at 2201.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. Stevens also described prior Congressional efforts to regulate the national market
for illicit drugs prior to the 1970 reforms. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2202 (describing the Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906 and the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914).
68
See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2202-03.
69
For Justice Stevens’s discussion of earlier federal marijuana regulation, see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2202.
70
See id. at 2203.
71
Justice Stevens noted that Congress had made the following findings to support the CSA:
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated
from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible

11

To accomplish this objective, Congress developed a closed regulatory system making it illegal
to “manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substances” other than as
authorized by the CSA.72 The CSA established five schedules for drugs based upon “their
accepted medical uses, the potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the
body.”73 Each schedule contains a distinct set of regulatory controls governing the manufacture,
distribution, and uses of the drugs. Marijuana is included in Schedule I, which contains the most
stringent regulations, including making “the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana
. . . a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug
Administration pre-approved research study.”74 Stevens explained that while the CSA delegates
authority to the Attorney General, after consulting with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), to move drugs between the five schedules, the considerable efforts by the
National Organization to Reform Marijuana Laws (“NORML”) to change the marijuana from
Schedule I have generally failed.75
Justice Stevens observed that Respondents did not challenge the passage of CSA as part of the
larger overhaul of drug laws set out in the Act, and that they did not contend that any provision or
section of the CSA exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.76 Instead, Stevens explained,
respondents presented the following, narrower claim: “[T]he CSA’s categorical prohibition of the
manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession
of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’s authority under
the Commerce Clause.”77

1. Justice Stevens’s Doctrinal Analysis
While Justice Stevens stressed the importance of reading the Commerce Clause cases in their
proper context, his historical analysis of the Commerce Clause doctrine was notably thin.78
Stevens explained that the Commerce Clause was enacted in response to the Framers’ perception
that the absence of federal commerce power had proved problematic under the Articles of
Confederation.79 He added that for the first century, the Commerce Clause was primarily
employed judicially against state laws that discriminated in commerce.80 Stevens then observed
that Congress began relying upon the Commerce Clause at the end of the Nineteenth Century,

to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and
distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal Control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is
essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203 n.21 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 (1)-(6)).
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203.
73
Id. at 2203-04.
74
Id. at 2204.
75
See id. at 2204 n.23. Stevens identified a single exception, which involved a 1988 decision of an Administrative
Law Judge concluding that it would be “unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious” to continue denying marijuana to
seriously ill patients. The DEA declined to endorse this opinion, and all prior and subsequent efforts at
reclassification, including five petitions for reclassification over thirty years in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, have failed. See id.
76
See id. at 2204.
77
Id. at 2204-05.
78
In fact, Stevens’s historical summary consisted of three paragraphs See id.
79
See id. at 2205.
80
See id.
72
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during the era of industrialization, in an effort to regulate the “increasingly interdependent national
economy.”81
While constitutional scholars generally recognize several changing historical periods in the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence,82 Justice Stevens instead presented the
resulting doctrine as comprising a single “‘new era,’ which now spans more than a century.”83
Stevens thus treated different doctrinal periods as continuous, and in so doing ascribed the Lopez
Court’s revised doctrinal formulation of the substantial effects category to cases from an earlier
period.84 This is important because the revised Lopez formulation, rather than the formulation that
it replaced, proved essential to Stevens’s ultimate determination that wheat, per Wickard, and
medical marijuana, per Raich, warranted like treatment under the Commerce Clause.

2. Lopez, Morrison, and the Doctrinal Transformation from
“Economic Effects” to “Economic Activities”
Justice Stevens listed the permissible Commerce Clause categories recognized in Lopez,85 and
reiterated in Morrison.86 In addition to the power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce,
and the instrumentalities, and persons or things traveling in interstate commerce, categories not
implicated in Wickard or Raich, Justice Stevens observed that long standing case law afforded
Congress the power to regulate “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”87
While Stevens initially presented the test articulated in such cases as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,88 and Perez v. United States,89 he then reformulated it, consistently with Lopez,
without identifying the source of modification or even mentioning the doctrinal change. Justice
Stevens stated: “Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local
activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.”90 Because this doctrinal transformation is important to the analysis to
follow, it is important to briefly consider its origins.
Other commentators have commented on, and criticized, Rehnquist’s doctrinal transformation in
Lopez from inquiring into whether the regulated activity had a substantial economic effect on
81

See id.
See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-216 (X ed. YEAR) (dividing
Commerce Clause jurisprudence into (1) The Interpretation from 1824-1936; (2) The Decline of Limits on the
Commerce Power from 1937- to 1995; (3) New Limits on Commerce Power Since 1995; and (4) External Limits on
Commerce Power).
83
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
84
Specifically, Stevens ascribed the “economic ‘class of activities’” test from the substantial effects category to Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1970), and to Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29, when neither case employed that
test. Instead, Perez quoted the famous Wickard formulation, contained at 317 U.S. at 125, and quoted supra note 10
(using economic to qualify effects, not activities). See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 n.5.
85
514 U.S. 558-59.
86
529 U.S. at 609. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
87
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
88
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce”).
89
402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (same).
90
Curiously, Justice Stevens went on to quote the Wickard formulation: “‘[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205-06. And yet, while claiming to apply
Wickard, Stevens instead rested his analysis on the critical reformulation in Lopez. Id. at 2211.
82
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commerce to whether the activity itself is economic.91 In one line of pre-Lopez Commerce Clause
cases, the Supreme Court had based the scope of Congress’s regulatory power on whether the
underlying activity was characterized as “economic.”92 These cases provide little support for the
use of a non-economic activities test in Lopez, however, because they involve the question of
whether Congress can regulate states acting as employers or as service providers in the same
manner that Congress regulates private actors.93 In the statutes at issue in Wickard and Raich, in
contrast, Congress was not regulating states or other units of government. Instead, Congress was
regulating private individuals. Instead of relying upon this line of cases for the new non-economic
activities test, Rehnquist cited Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States,94 Katzenbach v. McClung,95
and Wickard,96 cases in which Congress regulated private actors and in which the Supreme Court
had applied the traditional substantial effects test without inquiring into the nature of the regulated
activity.97

3. The Wickard Connection
While Stevens suggested that the Wickard Court sustained Congress’s regulation of wheat
production as a quintessential economic activity, a careful reading of the case demonstrates
otherwise. Indeed, Wickard rejected the very formalist analysis that in an earlier period invalidated
the regulation of production, including minimum wages and maximum hours in manufacturing, on
91

Justice Breyer, dissenting in Lopez, observed:
Moreover, the majority's test is not consistent with what the Court saw as the point of the
cases that the majority now characterizes. Although the majority today attempts to
categorize Perez, McClung, and Wickard as involving intrastate "economic activity," the
Courts that decided each of those cases did not focus upon the economic nature of the
activity regulated. Rather, they focused upon whether that activity affected interstate or
foreign commerce. In fact, the Wickard Court expressly held that Filburn's consumption of
homegrown wheat, "though it may not be regarded as commerce," could nevertheless be
regulated -- "whatever its nature" -- so long as "it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce."

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 628 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal citation
omitted). For academic commentaries on this doctrinal formulation, see, for example, Robert A. Schapiro & William
W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power And Perspective In Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1199, 1222 (2003); Adrienne J. Vaughan, The Civil Rights Remedy Of The Violence Against Women Act As
Litigated In United States v. Morrison: The Supreme Court's Sacrificial Lamb To Reinforce United States v. Lopez, 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 163, 166 (2000).
92
Prior critics of Lopez have not focused on the use of economic activities in this group of Commerce Clause cases.
93
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 13, 52 Stat. 1060, 1067, to the San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), stating that even though SAMTA’s activities “might well be
characterized as local . . . it has long been settled that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause extends to
intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce.” Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537. In formulating the economic
activities test, the Garcia Court relied upon Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which sustained the application
of FLSA to state schools and hospitals, stating: “If a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated
by the Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities
to federal regulation.” Id. at 197.
94
379 U.S. 241, 269 (1964).
95
379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964).
96
317 U.S. 111, 125.
97
See Lopez, 514 U.S. 559-60. While Rehnquist reformulated the substantial activities test to limit Congress’s
lawmaking power in the expansive substantial effects category, as explained in the next part, see infra part III, the
doctrinal transformation was not necessary to the holdings in Lopez or Morrison.
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the ground that it was an activity that preceded commerce, and thus within the protected sphere of
reserved state powers.98 Instead, Wickard sustained Congress’s regulation of wheat production
because of the effect that allowing such production without regulation would have had on the
regulated interstate wheat market.
Justice Stevens explained that the Wickard Court considered the application to Filburn of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which was intended to bolster the price of wheat amid a glut
by limiting the volume of wheat produced.99 Filburn had been allotted 11.1 acres for his 1941
wheat crop, but sowed 23 acres instead.100 Filburn maintained, and the government stipulated, that
he used the excess entirely on his own farm.101
Justice Stevens quoted the following excerpt from Justice Jackson’s famous decision, rejecting
Filburn’s argument that the penalty for violating his wheat quota exceeded Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers:
The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced
for market and the extent to which one may forestall resort to the market by
producing to meet his own needs. That appellee’s own contribution to the demand
for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.102

After noting several factual similarities between Raich and Wickard,103 Justice Stevens
explained:
In Wickard, we had no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for
believing that, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat
outside the regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on price and
market conditions. Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that
leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect
price and market conditions. 104

Justice Stevens explained that as in Wickard, where the Court recognized Congress’s concern
that enforcing production quotas was necessary to protect rising market prices given that wheat
intended for home consumption competed with wheat in commerce, in Raich Congress had
expressed a parallel concern that the high demand for illicit marijuana will draw in home-grown
98

See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not
a part of it.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1824) (“[I]nspection laws . . . act upon the subject before it
becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose.”)
99
See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118).
100
See id.
101
See id.
102
Id. at 2206 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28).
103
Justice Stevens explained:
Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible
commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market. Just as the Agricultural
Adjustment Act was designed "to control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign
commerce in order to avoid surpluses . . . " and consequently control the market price, . . . a primary
purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and
unlawful drug markets.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206-07.
104
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207. To support this argument, Stevens noted that respondents had themselves participated in
the illegal marijuana market. See id. n.28.
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marijuana intended for medical use.105 One difficulty with Steven’s analysis, however, is that the
issue in Raich was not whether Congress could limit the market in marijuana as an illegal drug.
Instead, it was whether, given the local nature of respondents’ activities and the use of state police
powers to regulate it, Congress had a rational basis for believing that the federal scheme would be
undermined if it did not also ban the more narrowly targeted class of state-sanctioned medical
marijuana. In analogizing wheat and marijuana, Justice Stevens assumed Congress’s power to
impose a complete ban, when that was the issue presented in the case.106
Justice Stevens explained that in applying the substantial effects test, the Court inquires only
whether Congress had a rational basis for having found a substantial effect. Given the difficulty in
assessing the origin of marijuana and of preventing diversion from legal to illicit channels, as
applied to the CSA’s complete ban, Stevens concluded that the scheme’s justification was not
merely rational, but was “visible to the naked eye.”107
Like Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment,108 Justice Stevens maintained that the
necessary and proper clause demonstrates that Congress had a rational basis in linking even local
use of marijuana to interstate commerce. Stevens stated:
[As] in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the
interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its
authority to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States. . . . That the regulation ensnares some
purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we
refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme.109

Justice Stevens rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance upon Lopez and Morrison in striking down
the absolute marijuana ban. Stevens explained that while those cases involved challenges to
isolated federal regulatory schemes, the Raich respondents were seeking to have the Court “excise
individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.”110 Instead, Stevens relied upon
the revised Lopez/Morrison framework to pose the central question in Raich as whether cultivating
(or otherwise acquiring) and using marijuana, even on the advice of a physician as permitted under
105
106

See id. at 2207.
Thus, Stevens stated:
While the diversion of homegrown wheat tended to frustrate the federal interest in
stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial transactions in the interstate
market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana tends to frustrate the federal interest in
eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate market in their entirety.

Id. As Justice Thomas observed in dissent, this part of Stevens’s argument is circular. The federal interest justifying
the ban on medical marijuana is defined to include all transactions, including those limited to physician-approved
uses. If the federal interest had instead been defined to prohibit illicit uses, permitting Congress to extend the ban to
approved medical uses would not necessarily further that federal interest. See id. at 2235 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
107
Id. at 2212. Stevens further argued that limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation “in accordance
with state law” cannot prevent Congressional regulation because the Supremacy Clause “unambiguously provides that
if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law must prevail.” Id. This argument is also circular, see
supra note 106, since federal law only prevails under the Supremacy Clause when in pursuance of the Constitution
and laws of the United States. If the Court had determined instead that as applied to respondents’ activities, which
were permitted under state law, the CSA was unconstitutional, the Supremacy Clause would not apply.
108
See infra part I.C.
109
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (internal quotations omitted).
110
Id. at 2209. Thus, Stevens explained that the Court has repeatedly asserted that “where the class of activities is
regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual
instances’ of the class.” Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. at 154).
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state law for a medical ailment, was “economic” activity and therefore within Congress’s power to
proscribe under the Commerce Clause. To answer this question, Stevens referred to the definition
of “Economics” set out in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,111 which includes “the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”112 Stevens concluded that
Respondent’s activities, like that of Mr. Filburn in Wickard, qualified as economic and was thus
within Congress’s power to proscribe.
While conceding that respondents’ narrow claim, seeking to protect physician-prescribed
medical marijuana from federal regulation as a “distinct class of activity,” might justify different
legislative or administrative treatment, Stevens concluded that it did not undermine Congress’s
constitutional exercise of lawmaking power.113 Instead, Stevens determined that the “personal
medical purposes on the advice of a physician” cannot distinguish Respondents’ activities from
other cultivation of marijuana banned by Schedule I of the CSA because Congress found that
marijuana has no legitimate use.114

C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence in the Judgment
In his separate opinion, Justice Scalia noted that while the Court, since Perez v. United States,115
has “mechanically recited” three permissible Commerce Clause categories, the listing is
misleading.116 Because “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves
part of interstate commerce,” Scalia explained, Congress’s power to regulate them “cannot come
from the Commerce Clause alone.”117 And yet, Congress sometimes finds it necessary and proper
to regulate interstate commerce by “eliminating potential obstructions” or by “eliminating
potential stimulants.”118 The resulting power to regulate intra-state activities that are not
themselves in commerce is expansive, Scalia explained, but “not without limitation.”119 Instead,
the power to regulate in the substantial effects cases is limited because the underlying activity
must be “economic,” and because the connection from the regulated activity to commerce cannot
result from “pil[ing] inference upon inference.”120
Scalia maintained that, at least implicitly, Lopez recognized Congress’s power to enact laws
necessary and proper to furthering its commerce power even if the regulation was not “directed
against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”121 Instead, in
regulating interstate commerce, Congress “possesses every power needed to make that regulation

111

See id. at 2211.
Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). As Justice Thomas noted in
dissent, it is curious why Stevens relied upon a forty-year-old dictionary to define economics. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at
2236 & n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113
See id. at 2211.
114
Id. Stevens conceded that the absolute ban on marijuana, through its continued Schedule I listing, might run
counter to current scientific evidence supporting a valid medical use, but maintained that such arguments should be
advanced to Congress, not to the Supreme Court. See id. at 2211 n.37 (citing studies).
115
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
116
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
117
Id. at 2215-16.
118
Id. at 2216.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 2217.
121
Id.
112
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effective.”122 While these two powers overlap, they are distinct. Scalia claimed that in Raich, the
distinction proved critical.123
While Stevens, writing for the majority, had distinguished Lopez and Morrison on the ground
that in those cases, Congress had regulated non-economic activities, Scalia instead maintained that
the distinction was more subtle. Whether or not Lopez and Morrison involved economic activity or
activity with a substantial effect on commerce, in contrast with the schemes at issue in Wickard
and Raich, neither case involved the regulation of local activity in a manner that was necessary
and proper in the furtherance of a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.124
As applied to the CSA, Scalia claimed, the resulting analysis was “straightforward.”125 As part
of its comprehensive regulatory scheme, the CSA sought to eliminate altogether traffic in
marijuana. Because marijuana is a fungible commodity, even though the cultivation of marijuana
itself might not qualify as an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, it
was necessary and proper for Congress to ban it entirely in order to effectuate Congress’s larger
regulatory scheme.126

D. Justice O’Connor’s Principal Dissent
In the principal dissent, which the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined, Justice O’Connor
claimed that properly viewed, the Raich facts exemplified the benefits of a scheme of horizontally
divided powers in which the states operated as experimental laboratories.127 O’Connor chided the
majority for thwarting this role and for producing “perverse incentive[s]” by allowing Congress to
regulate local non-economic activity provided it somehow linked the regulation to a broader
regulatory scheme.128 O’Connor claimed that the same arguments for rejecting the application of

122
123

Id.
This analysis helped Scalia to offer the following alternative reading of Wickard:
Because the unregulated production of wheat for personal consumption diminished demand
in the regulated wheat market, the Court said, it carried with it the potential to disrupt
Congress’s price regulation by driving down prices in the market. This potential disruption
of Congress’s interstate regulation, and not only the effect that personal consumption of
wheat had on interstate commerce, justified Congress's regulation of that conduct.

Id. at 2217 n.2 (citation omitted).
124
See id. at 2218 (positing that “Lopez expressly disclaimed that it was such a case, and Morrison did not even
discuss the possibility that it was [such a case].”) (citations omitted). Scalia’s reasoning is at least potentially in
tension with that of Judge Roberts, as expressed both in his confirmation hearing, see supra note 37, and cites therein,
and in his dissent from the denial of the petition of rehearing en banc in Rancho Viejo, see 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts,
J., dissenting), in which he maintained that the difficulty in applying the Endangered Species Act was that the overall
regulatory scheme, but not the regulated activity itself, substantially affected interstate commerce.
125
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219.
126
Scalia rejected the principal dissent’s criticism that the majority analysis turns Lopez into a drafting guide by letting
Congress regulate local activity when linked to a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. Scalia argued instead that
Congress’s power to regulate local non-economic activities remains limited because as a precondition, Congress must
have in place a comprehensive scheme regulating activity affecting interstate commerce, a requirement that he
claimed was absent in Lopez and Morrison. See id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
127
See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
128
See id. at 2223 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand our discussion of the role of courts in enforcing
outer limits of the Commerce Clause for the sake of maintaining the federalist balance our Constitution requires, . . .
as a signal to Congress to enact legislation that is more extensive and more intrusive into the domain of state power.”).
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the Commerce Clause in Lopez also applied in Raich,129 and that under the Court’s analysis,
Congress could justify the same regulation as part of a larger scheme regulating commerce in
guns.130 O’Connor claimed that Lopez did not invite such evasion, but instead it required the Court
to identify “objective markers” that properly limit Congressional powers in Commerce Clause
cases.131 O’Connor explained: “The task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to
regulate more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than
everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis).”132
O’Connor identified several such markers in Raich. First, both the CSA and state law recognize
that medical and non-medical use of drugs “are realistically distinct and can be segregated” for
regulatory purposes.133 Second, respondents limited their claim to state-permitted, physicianprescribed, medical marijuana. Third, Raich arises in a regime of overlapping federal and state
regulation in an area of criminal law in which “States lay claim by right of history and
expertise.”134 Finally, California had drawn upon its reserved powers to distinguish medicinal and
recreational use of marijuana.135
O’Connor also identified three factors that distinguished Raich from Wickard. First, after
rejecting the majority’s “dictionary definition” of economics as “breathtaking,”136 O’Connor
maintained that unlike wheat, “The home grown cultivation and personal use of marijuana for
medicinal purposes has no apparent commercial character.”137 Second, in contrast with the broad
reach of the CSA, the Agricultural Act of 1938 exempted “small-scale, noncommercial wheat
farming.”138 Finally, O’Connor maintained that while the Wickard Court relied upon stipulations
concerning the effects of domestically produced wheat on the overall market,139 in Raich,
Congress’s findings amounted to no more than a bold claim concerning the need for an absolute
ban.140 O’Connor concluded that in contrast with Raich, “Wickard . . . did not extend Commerce
Clause authority to something as modest as the home cook’s herb garden.”141

E. Justice Thomas’s Dissent

129

First, Lopez involved criminal activity that was not economic. See id. at 2221-22. Second, the Gun-Free School
Zones Act contained no express jurisdictional element linking the regulated activity to commerce. See id. Third,
Congress had made no legislative findings that linked the regulated activity to commerce. See id. And finally, the
Court’s analysis revealed the linkage between the regulated activity and commerce to be attenuated. See id.
130
Id. at 2223.
131
See id. at 2223.
132
See id.
133
See id. at 2224.
134
Id.
135
See id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 2225. In addition, O’Connor noted that marijuana is “highly unusual” in that it can be manufactured entirely
with local materials that have not traveled interstate. See id.
138
See id. (“When Filburn planted the wheat at issue in Wickard, the statute exempted plantings less than 200 bushels
(about six tons), and when he harvested his wheat it exempted plantings less than six acres.”).
139
See id. at 2227.
140
See id. at 2227 (claiming that the Congressional findings “amount to no more than a legislative insistence that the
regulation of controlled substances must be absolute,” and that “[t]hese bare declarations cannot be compared to the
record before the Court in Wickard.”).
141
Id.
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In an independent dissent, Justice Thomas reiterated his call for fundamental Commerce Clause
reform, as set out in his Lopez concurrence, claiming that the original meaning of commerce was
limited to the buying and selling of goods and services.142 Under this more radical approach to
Commerce Clause reform, Thomas would reject altogether the category of cases allowing
Congress to regulate local activities on the ground that they have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce without regard to whether the activities themselves, or their effect on commerce, can be
described as economic.
In his Lopez opinion, Thomas steadfastly rejected the Wickard multiplier analysis as a clever but
limitless argument.143 In Raich, however, Thomas maintained that even the substantial effects test
does not provide a basis for allowing Congress to apply the CSA to respondents’ activities.
Because Raich presented an as-applied, rather than a facial, challenge, Thomas argued, it was not
sufficient for the claimed exercise of Congressional commerce power to maintain that unregulated
marijuana growers could “swell” the market for marijuana.144 Instead, the issue was whether,
given the statutory limits upon permissible use in California, it is necessary and proper to the CSA
to limit even locally grown marijuana specifically intended for medical use.145 Thomas concluded
that the answer was no.

II.

Devising a Game Theoretical Model of Permissible
Commerce Clause Powers

What emerges most prominently from the prior discussion is that none of the four Raich
opinions offers a framework with which to develop a comprehensive normative theory of the
Commerce Clause capable of reconciling the expansive post-New Deal cases with the Supreme
Court’s more recent project of imposing meaningful limits on the permissible scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers. Justice Stevens treated all Commerce Clause cases, beginning in the
late nineteenth century, as a uniform whole and inquired, based upon the Lopez non-economic
activities test, whether respondents’ activities were “economic.” But in answering this question,
Stevens relied upon a dictionary definition that, ironically, prevented a meaningful economic
analysis of the permissible scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. While Stevens’s placed
142

See id. at 2229-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point.”).
144
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145
See id. at 2233-34. Thus, Thomas stated:
But even assuming that States’ controls allow some seepage of medical marijuana into the illicit
drug market, there is a multibillion-dollar interstate market for marijuana. It is difficult to see how
this vast market could be affected by diverted medical cannabis, let alone in a way that makes
regulating intrastate medical marijuana obviously essential to controlling the interstate drug market.
143

Id. at 2233 (citing Executive Office of the President, Office of Nat. Drug Control Policy, Marijuana Fact Sheet 5 (Feb.
2004) http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/marijuana/index.html.) Legalizing marijuana can
have both a supply side and a demand side effect. While Thomas focused on the demand side, namely how marijuana
can seep from the legal to the illegal market, it is also possible that the increased demand from medical marijuana can
affect the supply of the illegal drug. The supply side effect is also unlikely to rise to a sufficient magnitude to
substantially affect interstate commerce, however, because as Justice Stevens noted for the majority, part of the supply
will be home grown, and thus limited to the intended user, see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200 (noting that “Monson
cultivates her own marijuana”), and because there is no evidence to support the claim that additional supplies for
approved medical users from illegal producers will have a substantial spillover effect with respect to illicit users given
the vast scope of the illicit marijuana market. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2233 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing
magnitude of the illicit marijuana market).
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Raich and Wickard in the same doctrinal category, he did so by resorting to a version of the very
formalism—now including what had once been a pre-commerce activity within Congress’s core
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause—that Wickard rejected.
Justice Scalia, who instead rested his analysis primarily on the necessary and proper clause,
maintained that Congress’s powers included the power to regulate non-economic activity and
activity that did not have a substantial effect on commerce, provided that Congress regulated that
activity within the context of a more comprehensive legislative scheme. This analysis also placed
Wickard and Raich in the same doctrinal category, but again failed to offer a means of imposing
meaningful limits on the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, other than
counterintuitively insisting upon broader regulatory schemes to sustain the narrowest applications.
Moreover, Scalia did not demand an economic justification for either the broader regulatory
scheme itself or the narrower class of activity attached to it.
In her principal dissent, Justice O’Connor distinguished Wickard and Raich, but employed an
alternative formalistic analysis in doing so. Applying O’Connor’s analysis, Congress could evade
any judicially imposed limits on the scope of its Commerce Clause powers provided it jumped
through certain hoops, including, most importantly, exempting some even narrower class of
activity, or articulating “findings” that link the regulated activity to commerce.
Finally, in his separate and broader dissent, Justice Thomas appeared to agree that Wickard and
Raich fall into the same category, but rejected the category on normative grounds. Abolishing the
substantial effects category, and limiting the permissible understanding of commerce to exchange
would produce a radical retrenchment of Commerce Clause doctrine, calling into question the
continuing validity of many Commerce Clause cases decided in the post-New Deal era.
Finding a viable theory that can reconcile the broad post-New Deal expansion of Commerce
Clause powers with the more recent efforts at retrenchment requires a careful understanding of the
relationship between “economics” and the Commerce Clause. A proper economic analysis of the
Commerce Clause demonstrates that, holding Raich aside, almost all of the post-New Deal
cases—including most notably Wickard, Lopez, and Morrison—fit within a coherent and
functional conception of the permissible scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.
The theory of the Commerce Clause set out below is simple. When Congress can rationally infer
that individual states have an incentive to obstruct rather than advance a selected regulatory
scheme, then only a central coordinating authority, namely Congress itself, can create a vehicle for
implementing and enforcing that scheme. Among the principal benefits of this normative theory, is
that it aligns the economic analysis of the doctrines governing the permissible scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers with the doctrines governing the use of the Commerce Clause,
operating in its dormant capacity, as a source of limitation on the permissible scope of state
regulatory powers.146
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For my comprehensive assessment of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, see Maxwell L. Stearns, A
Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 145 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1 (2003). In that article, I demonstrated that almost all Dormant Commerce Clause cases could be explained by
introducing a second game theoretical dimension beyond the traditional justification of the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine as solving a prisoners’ dilemma among potentially defecting states. See id. at 69-118. By also
considering the possibility that states can upset a benign multiple Nash equilibrium game that facilitates the flow of
commerce, the analysis reconciles not only the Dormant Commerce Clause cases, see id. at 123-54, but also such
related doctrines as the market participant cases, Article IV privileges and immunities doctrine, and the export
taxation doctrine. See id. at 118-23.
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Coordination difficulties, as shown below, arise primarily in two contexts. First, they arise when
individual firms or states could evade a scheme affecting pricing, working conditions, or
environmental regulations. Second, they arise when individual states could pursue policies that
impose geographical obstructions or inhibitions to commerce. Using two simple games, the
prisoners’ dilemma and the multiple Nash equilibrium game,147 this part identifies the conditions
under which defection from beneficial coordination is likely to arise, and thus when central
regulation, taking the form of an exercise of Congressional Commerce Clause powers, is justified.
In this part, I will further draw upon actual Commerce Clause cases to the extent that they are
helpful in developing the formal models. Other applications are presented in part III. The analysis
begins with an alternative account of Wickard, based upon the prisoners’ dilemma, which explains
how Congress has used its Commerce Clause power to develop solutions to coordination problems
that are beyond the competence of states, acting on their own, to enact unilaterally. I then apply
the model in two other contexts that present similar coordination problems.

A. Coordination on the Supply Side: Wickard v. Filburn and Cartel
Enforcement
Let us now reconsider Wickard v. Filburn.148 Wickard emerged in the aftermath of the Great
Depression, during a period in which a major wheat glut resulted in a dramatic decline in wheat
prices. Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture to propose a referendum, subject to a two thirds majority vote among wheat
farmers, which would result in the imposition of a “compulsory national marketing quota.”149
Filburn, who was penalized for violating his quota, raised, among other arguments, a claim that as
applied to him, the 1938 statute exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
The Wickard opinion is almost invariably cited for its multiplier analysis.150 Focusing on other,
less well known aspects of the case helps to lay a foundation for the first game justifying
Congressional Commerce Clause authority. With respect to the four wheat net exporter nations,
Jackson explained: “It is interesting to note that all of these have federated systems of government,
not of course without important differences. In all of them, wheat regulation is by the national
government.”151 This raises the question why none of the four net export nations employed a
decentralized solution to the problem of depressed wheat pricing.152
Justice Jackson also explained the incentives that the coordinated scheme created for individual
producers like Filburn: “It is agreed that as a result of the wheat programs he is able to market his
147

The analysis also draws upon insights from the empty core bargaining game to demonstrate the circumstances
under which moves from decentralized to centralized decision making, or the reverse, among three or more players,
can produce superadditive gains. See infra notes 161 through 163, and accompanying text.
148
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
149
Id. at 115.
150
See supra text accompanying note 102 (quoting passage from Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28).
151
Id. at 126 n.27. Jackson also explained:
The four large exporting countries of Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States have all
undertaken various programs for the relief of growers. Such measures have been designed, in part at
least, to protect the domestic price received by producers. Such plans have generally evolved
towards control by the central government.
Id. at 125-26.
152
Indeed, Justice Jackson suggested an evolutionary process in which experimentation with more local regulation
among the net exporter nations failed to produce the desired effect, prompting central regulatory controls. See id.
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wheat at a price ‘far above any world price based on the natural reaction of supply and
demand.’”153 Jackson recognized that while small scale producers, like Filburn, were given a
choice to cooperate and receive the higher price, or not to cooperate and be penalized,154 the quota
produced an incentive to reap the benefit of the heightened price while avoiding the imposed
restrictions that created them.
These two observations help to explain Wickard as more than a clever argument, premised upon
the very multiplier analysis that the Court had then recently rejected in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.155 Instead, Wickard rested upon an intuition, albeit one not fully developed into a theory, that
certain structural conditions required policies to operate strictly at the national level, and that once
those policies were implemented, enforcement was most effective if coupled with a signal
operating at the lowest level of agreed upon restraint.156
To generalize the problem, imagine that in a given year there is an anticipated wheat glut that
will force down prices below an acceptable level. A price increase can be affected either by
enhancing demand or by restricting supply.157 The question then is how to accomplish this, a
problem that is well understood in the literature on the theory of cartels.158 If a group of producers
that collectively has market power over their products seeks to raise their prices, they can achieve
this objective most easily by agreeing to collective restrictions on their aggregate outputs. The
ideal restriction is one that would replicate the outputs of a single firm controlling production for
the entire market. A firm with complete market power faces a downward sloping demand curve

153

Id. at 130-31.
See id. at 132.
155
298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936):
If the production by one man of a single ton of coal intended for interstate sale and shipment, and
actually so sold and shipped, affects interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does not become
direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed, or adding to the
expense or complexities of the business, or by all combined.
156
This is not to suggest that the scheme would not have produced any monopoly rent if only the larger producers’
outputs were cartelized, and in fact, this observation helps to explain why large producers were motivated to coerce
smaller ones to comply through the two thirds voting requirement. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16.
157
See id. at 137 (“The maintenance by government regulation of a price for wheat undoubtedly can be accomplished
as effectively by sustaining or increasing the demand as by limiting the supply.”)
158
For general discussions of cartel theory, see GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 230-31 (3d ed. 1966); see
also Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, 417-24 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
154
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Figure 1 depicts a downward sloping demand curve, which confronts a monopolistic firm.159
The price is set where the supply and demand curves for the suppliers and the consumers as a
whole meet. In Figure 1, this results in Qc and Pc. In contrast, if the firm is a monopolist, the
market demand curve is downward sloping because for each additional unit sold, the price drops
for all units sold of the same good. In setting an optimal price, the monopolistic firm considers not
only the downward sloping demand curve, but also the marginal revenue curve that lies below the
demand curve. The monopolist’s ideal strategy is to set price where marginal cost, or supply,
equals marginal revenue, and then to set the price along the corresponding demand curve. In
Figure 1, this means that the optimal strategy is to set quantity at Qm and price at Pm.
The difficulty that confronts members of a cartel, in contrast with a single monopolistic firm, is
one of coordination. Unlike the monopolistic firm, the members of the cartel do not have
individual control of the entire market output. Assuming no legal barriers to horizontal price
fixing, the would-be cartelists are motivated to agree upon outputs that correspond to the level that
a single firm would achieve, and then to use the reduction in outputs to command a monopolistic
price. The problem, however, involves setting and enforcing the necessary allocations.

159

For a more detailed discussion that includes an analysis of various forms of rent and of rent seeking, see Stearns,
supra note 146, at 97-102; MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY
111-17 (1997). For a firm that has no market power, and thus no control over prices, in contrast, the relevant demand
curve is effectively flat.
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While farmers might agree on the desire to secure monopolistic rents,160 they are less likely to
agree on how the necessary production cuts should be allocated to produce that result. The
difficulties that firms confront in determining such allocations can be assessed based upon a game
theoretical insight that involves core theory. Core theory demonstrates that for any potential
coalition of manufacturers proposing a scheme of output reductions, an alternative, superior,
coalition exists that will benefit from an alternative scheme that improves the position of a newly
constituted group of manufacturers.161
Empty cores are endemic to policymaking because they arise whenever there is a gain, or
superadditivity, that results from replacing atomistic decision making with coordinated
behavior.162 The empty core reflects the absence of a unique or even dominant equilibrium
solution in allocating the superadditive gains.163 One solution to the problem of bargaining in the
absence of a core is government coercion, and this no doubt characterizes Wickard.164
Assume for now that the parties have agreed to an allocation formula, for example uniform
percentage cuts based upon the prior year’s production, or based upon an average over the prior
five years’ production. Even assuming such agreement, the parties confront an equally daunting
task of monitoring and punishing defection. Once production quotas are set and the resulting price
is raised from the competitive to the oligopolistic equilibrium levels,165 the cartel members
160

In Figure 1, the rent comprises the reduction in the competitive rents, boxes B and D, associated with a market in
which demand is downward sloping for the industry as a whole, but is flat for individual firms. Even though no
individual firm is large enough relative to the overall market to affect prices by reducing its outputs, substantial
differences remain among individual firms. As a result of differences in soil conditions, climates, or other factors,
some firms obtain, at the price controlled by the market, relatively higher competitive rents than others. The
aggregation of these rents is depicted in areas B and C, which lie above the marginal cost curve. By moving from a
competitive to a monopolistic price, the affected firms instead obtain the monopolistic profit, as depicted in areas A
and B, which lie above the marginal cost curve but to the left of the level of output set at Qm. Because the firms gain
rents equal to (A+B), but lose the competitive rents (B+D), the monopolistic rent (A-D), represents the improved
payoff to the industry as a whole of moving from a competitive to a monopolistic price. For a more detailed
discussion, see Stearns, supra note 146, and cite therein.
161
See generally John S. Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and the Empty Core, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 558 (1987) (describing
empty core game).
162
Empty core bargaining games can also arise in reverse, namely in replacing centralized coordination with
decentralized decision making. As shown in Figure 1, moving from competitive to noncompetitive pricing produces a
societal welfare loss, representing the part of the consumer surplus that is not transferred to the producer. (The part of
the consumer surplus transferred to the producer is a wealth transfer rather than a welfare loss.) While the cartel game
involves the allocation of gains resulting from centrally coordinating outputs, the game focuses solely on the benefit to
the producers, without accounting for the resulting societal welfare loss. Congress can also facilitate superadditive
gains by encouraging a competitive or decentralized decision making regime. As shown in the discussion of
environmental regulation, the possibility of such gains sometimes proves essential in encouraging states to effectuate
various policies associated with waste storage. See infra part II.C.
163
For my more detailed introduction to the problem of the empty core, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1233-47 (1994) (exploring various implications of empty core
bargaining for institutional design).
164
Thus, while the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 allowed 1/3 plus one producers to veto a proffered scheme of
allocations, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 116 (1942) (“if more than one-third of the farmers voting in the
referendum do oppose, the Secretary must, prior to the effective date of the quota, by proclamation suspend its
operation”), a lower percentage in opposition, perhaps reflecting the local growers whose home grown wheat, like that
of Filburn, competed with wheat in commerce, was effectively coerced by the supermajority’s agreed upon allocation
scheme. Notice that the referendum of wheat growers held on May 31, 1941, was approved by 81 % to 19 %. See id.
165
Oligopoly refers to a group of producers that collectively possess market power, and thus a downward sloping
demand curve, as opposed to a monopolist, who has exclusive market power. The demand curve confronting an
individual firm in an oligopoly takes a somewhat different form from that facing a monopolist as depicted in Figure 1.
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suddenly have a strong incentive to cheat by producing above quota.166 Assuming a mechanism
for punishment or that detected cheating threatens to unravel the cartel, rational cartelists will try
to cheat in a sufficiently modest amount to escape detection. If a sufficient number cheat,
however, the aggregate effect is to move the now cartelized price back in the direction of the
competitive market price.167
In effect, the cartel members confront a classic prisoners’ dilemma. Each member obtains a
higher payout by cooperating, meaning that he or she accepts the assigned or agreed upon quota,
thus producing a lower level of output, but selling the output at a higher price. Once the higher
price is achieved as a result of the overall quota scheme, however, it is then rational for each cartel
member to cheat in an effort to capture more of the gains associated with the above-competitive
pricing strategy. The prisoners’ dilemma characterizes this game because each producer has the
same incentive to cheat without regard to what the remaining producers do. If all other members
cooperate, thus abiding the assigned quota, then for any given firm, there is an incentive to cheat
and to sell more at the higher price. Conversely, if the other firms cheat, it remains rational to
cheat and thus to capture as much of the higher price as possible until the overall pricing scheme
erodes. Because these payoffs are reciprocal, the dominant outcome is mutual defection.
Table 1 depicts the resulting game, using two firms, A and B.
Table 1: The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Payoffs for (A,B)

A Cooperates

A Cheats

B Cooperates

(10, 10)

(12, 5)

B Cheats

(5, 12)

(7,7)

For expositional purpose, Table 1 considers a prisoners’ dilemma game involving two firms that
together have market power.168 If firms A and B cooperate, each receives a payoff of 10, which
results from optimally reduced production and resulting higher prices. If instead one party cheats,
then as a result of the additional production, the price will erode somewhat for both parties, albeit
not as much as if both parties cheated. The cheating party receives a benefit because she sells more
than her allotted share at a non-competitive price, even if the price is slightly lower than that
resulting from strict cartel enforcement in a regime of mutual cooperation. Conversely, because
the price has eroded as a result of one party’s cheating, the party who cooperated and thus limited
For the individual firm in an oligopoly, the demand curve appears “kinked.” Demand is highly inelastic (meaning a
change in price results in a dramatic reduction in quantity purchased) when the oligopolist raises price above the point
of equilibrium for the oligopoly as a whole, and is highly elastic (meaning that a lowering of the price results in a
dramatic increase in the quantity purchased) for prices below the set equilibrium point for the oligopoly as a whole.
See generally ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LESTER C. THUROW, UNDERSTANDING MICROECONOMICS 180 (1975). See
also William Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate Inventors to Sell Patents, 58
MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1112 (2004) (“[The] producers in an oligopoly are faced with a downward sloping demand
curve and charge prices in excess of marginal cost, and generally each producer is reluctant to charge a price that is
significantly different from other producers in the market.”).
166
See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE
OF EVERYTHING 25 (2005) (describing cheating as “a primordial economic act.”).
167
Again, cheating would not necessarily eliminate all potential monopolistic rents. See supra note 156.
168
While this game depicts two firms, the essential intuition can be generalized to any size cartel.
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production to the assigned allocation at the now slightly reduced price receives a reduced payoff
relative to mutual cooperation. The resulting payoffs are 12 for the cheating party and 5 for the
cooperating party. Finally, if both parties cheat, the price erodes entirely to the competitive levels.
While each party produces as much as is cost effective, the resulting payoff of 7 is lower than the
potential payoff of 10 associated with mutual cooperation.
As is generally true in prisoners’ dilemmas, the relationships between and among the numbers
are important rather than the actual numbers themselves. Given the payoff relationships in this
game, regardless of what the other player does, it is rational for each player to cheat. This is true
even though if the cartel were enforced, each player would receive a higher payoff than in the
resulting regime of mutual defection.
Because it is rational for the cartel members to cheat, the question arises how to prevent mutual
defection. An obvious, and powerful, solution is to seek governmental enforcement. Government
enforcement offers three significant benefits. First, by having the government, rather than the
parties, impose and enforce the quotas, the parties avoid any legal repercussions associated with
privately agreed upon horizontal price fixing.169 Second, allowing the government to set quotas
ameliorates some of the difficulties associated with agreeing on allocations by creating a coercive
mechanism against those who would hold out for a superior allocation.170 Third, and most
importantly, government enforcement provides the necessary mechanism to monitor and punish
cheating.171
These insights help to explain Justice Jackson’s observation in Wickard that in each wheat net
exporting nation, which by coincidence had a federalist form of government,172 the wheat
production scheme operated at the national level. While the prior analysis explained the need for
governmental intervention, we now need to explain why in a scheme characterized by federalism,
such a scheme must be implemented nationally rather than among separate states.
Thankfully, the analysis is simple in that it tracks the presentation of the prisoners’ dilemma
confronting two firms. Imagine a federalist system with two states, A and B, which both produce
wheat during a glut. Ideally, each state, A and B, would recognize the need for a quota, and would
impose output restrictions that result in the equivalent of monopolistic pricing. The difficulty,
however, is that each state realizes that the ideal regime is one in which the other state strictly sets
and enforces its quotas, thus raising the price to the monopolistic level, while allowing its own
farmers to cheat by producing above quota to capture more sales at the now higher price. If instead
169

See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 263 (1978) (discussing benefits
of ban on horizontal price fixing in promoting consumer welfare); see also Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The
Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359,
392-93 (explaining FTC policy of pursuing enforcement actions against “naked horizontal agreements such as pure
price fixing, naked output restraints or market divisions, and bans on advertising,” and other means by which firms
make peace with each other but to the detriment of consumers.)
170
For an analysis applying this to the 2/3 rule in Wickard, see supra note 164. Cooperative advertising programs,
which the Supreme Court recently struck down as a First Amendment violation, raise similar concerns about coercing
small firms to join schemes that benefit larger producers. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001)
(striking mushroom checkoff program on grounds that it forced contributions for the purpose of advertising, rather
than some other associational benefit).
171
Kenneth Davidson, 1982 Merger Guidelines: The Competitive Significance of Segmented Markets, 71 CAL. L. REV.
445, 451(1983) (“The temptation to cheat appears to have been too great to maintain price agreements through purely
voluntary undertakings. To be sure, price fixing can be sustained if enforced or supported by government action, as is
the case with many agricultural products.”)
172
Hopefully most would agree that net wheat exporter status is an unlikely cause of federalism.
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the other state cheats, it still remains rational to cheat. While each state would receive a higher
payoff in a regime of mutual cooperation, thus adhering to the agreed upon quotas, because both
states are motivated to cheat regardless of what the other state does, the dominant outcome is
mutual defection. The payoffs in Table 1 capture the basic game and explain why a decentralized
solution to imposing a quota-and-monitoring regime will not suffice to create an optimal output
and pricing scheme within a federalist system.173
The analysis thus far highlights an important point about Commerce Clause regulation. In
facilitating a scheme of output reductions and raised prices, Congress is providing a benefit to
wheat producers that economists would classify as a form of rent. Public choice economists are
critical of rent seeking behavior. In part this is the result of the societal welfare loss that rent
seeking produces (consider the lost consumer’s surplus resulting from the move from competitive
to noncompetitive pricing),174 and in part it is due to the deadweight losses resulting from rent
seeking activity itself.175 And yet, the Wickard Court sustained the application of the penalty used
to preserve the new pricing scheme as applied to Filburn. This implies that the Commerce Clause
doctrine as articulated in Wickard, inquiring whether the regulated activity has a substantial
economic effect on commerce, does not demand that Congress only exercise Commerce Clause
power to produce efficient results. Even rent seeking activity is condoned under the Commerce
Clause provided that there is a structural economic justification for implementing the selected
scheme centrally, rather than on a state-by-state basis.
While the preceding structural analysis might make Wickard appear an easy case justifying
Congressional intervention,176 one important step remains. Once we employ a central authority to
set quotas, what is to prevent individual producers from cheating, or the states from failing to
enforce the resulting agreement?
To ensure compliance with the established wheat cartel, it is also critical to signal that defection,
or at least defection below a certain point, will not be tolerated. The issue is how to send the
appropriate signal. One might imagine sending a signal to the largest producers who cheat, thus
ensuring that other large scale producers cooperate. The problem is that signals work in more than
one direction. Signaling enforcement against top producers also signals that for those who are not
top producers, cheating will be tolerated. The government can, of course, start at the top and
gradually work its way down, thus determining the point at which it is no longer cost effective to
monitor and punish cheaters. The difficulty, however, is that such an approach sends a clear signal
173

In theory, the same prisoners’ dilemma among firms and states that requires a federal solution to cartelizing wheat
outputs could recur among wheat exporter nations, thus undermining the pricing scheme. This is less likely, however,
because unlike states, which are forbidden to discriminate in commerce by the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
the United States can effect an import quota or tariff to protect domestically raised prices and thus can prevent other
nations from dissipating the gains to affected farmers. For a helpful discussion, see David R. Purnell, A Critical
Examination of the Targeted Export Assistance Program, Its Transformation into the Market Promotion Program and
Its Future, 18 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 551, 558 n.141 (1993) (describing statutory changes to Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 affecting power to impose quotas and tariffs).
174
More precisely, under a competitive pricing structure, the consumer surplus is (A+C), but because monopolistic
pricing allocates A to the producers, the deadweight societal loss is represented in area C. For a more detailed
discussion, see Stearns, supra note 146, at 97-102 (discussing various forms of rent).
175
For seminal works on rent seeking, see Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, AM. ECON. REV., June
1974, at 291, 302.
176
This argument is based solely upon the Commerce Clause doctrine. See infra note 185, and cites therein (arguing
that challenges to the merits of these policies should rest on other constitutional bases).
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to producers below a certain size that although their defection is not legal, as against them, the law
will not be enforced.177
Now consider an alternative approach. What about sending a signal by enforcing the cartel
against the smallest producer who falls within the quota policy approved by Congress and set by
the Secretary of Agriculture with the requisite approval of 2/3 of the wheat producers? By
enforcing the law against a recalcitrant small scale producer like Filburn, the Secretary of
Agriculture sends a highly effective low cost signal that the cartel will be enforced as envisioned
in the law that created it. Certainly if the government is willing to invest resources prosecuting
Filburn, all other producers from those slightly larger than Filburn to the largest wheat producers
will be on notice that their cheating will not be tolerated.
Let us once again consider the much criticized passage from Justice Jackson’s Wickard opinion:
“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough
to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”178 Commentators have read this
passage to mean that Congress has the power to regulate any activity, regardless of its scope,
because by multiplying that activity by a sufficiently large number, the effect is to produce the
same activity on a national scale.179 A more careful reading, however, suggests that without
authority to signal enforcement of the wheat production allocations at the level set by Congress,
the Secretary of Agriculture would not have been able to prevent the mass of producers who were
similarly situated to Filburn and whose activities were a major source of competition with wheat
in commerce, from cheating from their production quotas.180 Absent that ability to control
collective outputs, the result would have been to allow a gradual erosion of the federal policy
implementing production quotas to boost wheat prices.
177

When the signal is noisy and enforcement costs are high, as for example is frequently the case in fighting street
crime, a triage approach makes considerable sense. When signaling is less noisy and enforcement costs are lower, in
contrast, it makes sense to send a clear signal at a lower level.
178
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
179
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK.
L. REV. 1185, 1211 n.92 (2003) (“In particular, the Wickard Court allowed Congress to regulate anything it pleased by
(1) upholding legislation that concerned noncommercial activities (such as growing wheat for personal consumption
rather than sale) merely because they had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, and (2) finding that this effect
could be measured by aggregating activities that were trivial in themselves.”).
180
Recall that consumption of home grown wheat varied in an amount of 20% of average production. See Wickard,
317 U.S. at 127. For a thoughtful and largely complementary analysis, see Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After
United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 818 (1996). Although Professor Althouse does not rest her analysis on
game theory, she recognizes a coordination difficulty preventing wheat producers themselves from controlling outputs
to bolster prices. The particular problem in Wickard, however, is not merely explaining the need for regulatory
intervention, but also explaining (1) why intervention had to be implemented at the federal, rather than state or local,
level, and (2) why, once implemented, it was appropriate to enforce the scheme against a small scale producer like
Filburn. Althouse posits:
Though local and small-scale, the individual behavior regulated really did contribute to an
interstate phenomenon, which states could not address on an individual basis. Indeed, high
levels of production by local businesses were unlikely even to be perceived as problems at
the local level. The problem existed only in the aggregate, thus demonstrating the national
character of the problem.
See id. Of course depressed wheat prices were perceived as a problem in all affected areas, and although small scale
violators contributed to the glut, this explanation ultimately follows the logic of the multiplier analysis. In contrast, the
game theoretical analysis presented in the text explains not only the need for regulatory intervention at the federal
level, but also the benefits of a strong signal against a small scale producer like Filburn.
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While the decision is often ridiculed, Wickard is actually an easy Commerce Clause case. But it
is not easy under any of the four normative theories of Commerce Clause doctrine expressed in the
opinions in Raich. Once the wheat producers settled on the policy to boost prices by coordinating
outputs, two essential steps remained. First, the quotas themselves had to be determined and
imposed by a central coordinating authority, and second, that authority had to signal that below the
point determined in the agreed upon scheme, which included exemptions based upon the small
scale of production,181 the quota scheme would be strictly enforced. Filburn, although operating on
a small scale, operated above the cutoff point for the implementation of the selected federal policy.
Read in context, Justice Jackson’s famous passage does not rest on the intuition that a small
activity is subject to federal regulation because it can be multiplied to achieve a larger level of the
same activity. Instead, Justice Jackson asserted that the selected production quotas will not achieve
the goal of raising the price of wheat unless they are enforced and they will not be enforced absent
a proper signal. Justice O’Connor is correct that the Wickard Court relied upon detailed
stipulations concerning the effect of home grown wheat on the wheat market,182 but those
stipulations did not merely demonstrate a link between something local and something national.
Instead, they demonstrated that home-produced wheat proved among the most significant variable
factors as a source of competition for wheat in commerce. Failing to signal enforcement against
this group—local wheat producers whose production was above the identified cutoff point for
required enforcement—threatened to move wheat pricing back in the direction of the previously
depressed competitive levels.183
The cartel game is one of four games that justify central coordinated intervention under the
Commerce Clause. We will now consider the remaining three games, and a paradigm case that
implicates none of the identified games.

B. Coordination on the Demand Side: Regulating Working
Conditions
Consider a policy to regulate certain conditions of employment. Such regulations might include
a prohibition against particular sources of labor, for example disallowing children below a certain
age from working at all or from working other than under specified protective conditions, or it
might include general limitations on working conditions for persons eligible to work, for example,
minimum wages or maximum hours. While economists and legal scholars have criticized laws
regulating working conditions on various normative grounds,184 the purpose here is not to assess
181
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While anxious readers undoubtedly appreciate the ease with which the Raich Court could have distinguished
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doctrine, not simply an assessment of Raich. Moreover, the coordination game involving cartel enforcement is but
one of four games that justify coordinated central regulation under the Commerce Clause. We must now consider the
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implicated, and thus in which coordinated intervention is not justified.
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These include (1) the libertarian principle that employers and workers should be allowed to contract on mutually
agreeable terms, see, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 135-40 (1992) (arguing against Supreme Court decisions sustaining minimum wage laws
based upon libertarian premises); (2) the policy argument that such laws disadvantage their claimed beneficiaries who
have fewer marketable skills and thus cannot secure work under the required contract terms, see, e.g., George J.
Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 358 (1946); Finis Welch, Minimum Wage
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the normative merit of labor regulations.185 Instead, it is to address a more limited question:
Assuming agreement on the underlying policies expressed in these laws, is a central coordinating
authority required to implement them? Based upon the preceding analysis, the answer is yes.
Assume a policy to prevent wages below a set minimum or to limit maximum working hours per
day or per week. If those selecting the policy choose decentralized implementation, they would
soon realize that individual states, trying to adopt the scheme, once again, confront a prisoners’
dilemma.186 Absent any such regulation, firms contract for labor on terms set by the market.
Relative to a regime imposing restrictions on labor contracting, market-based wages allow firms to
operate at lower cost. If not, firms would implement policies reflecting societal consensus
concerning proper working conditions even absent regulatory intervention. Of course firms do
generally not elect to impose labor restrictions on themselves that raise the cost of doing business
as compared with competitors, and so the question then arises how best to facilitate the desired
regulatory regime.
First consider implementation at the state level in light of the prisoners’ dilemma in Table 1.187
Assuming minimum wage laws will be implemented, all states would receive a relatively higher
payoff if the policy were implemented and enforced in a uniform fashion. Whatever disadvantages
minimum wage laws impose upon them, the burden is diminished when all firms bear the burdens
in like fashion.188 This regime is depicted in the upper left box with payoffs of (10, 10). From the
perspective of any given state, however, the preferred regime is one in which other states police
their firms’ working conditions, while that state cheats by declining to police the working
conditions of its firms. This regime of unilateral defection is depicted in the upper right and lower
left boxes, with payoffs of (12, 5) or (5, 12). The firms in the defecting state are able to compete
with lax regulatory enforcement against firms in states with strict regulatory enforcement and who
are thus disadvantaged by the resulting higher labor costs. And of course if other states also
decline to adopt the preferred labor policies, it remains rational for any individual state to defect,
producing the outcome of mutual defection, with the lowest mutual payoffs (7, 7). As in the prior
Legislation in the United States, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 285 (1974); and (3) the public choice observation that such laws
were often motivated by the desire of present workers to limit competition, for example, from women, see Michael J.
Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 497 (1998) (“[M]inimum wage laws for
women may have reflected the interests of male-dominated unions interested in reducing competition for their
members’ services.”). For a debate on the empirical question whether minimum wage laws adversely affect unskilled
workers, compare DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE
MINIMUM WAGE (1995) (questioning neo-classical analysis on empirical grounds), with Review Symposium, Myth and
Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 497 (1994) (criticizing Card
and Krueger study on methodological grounds).
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Whatever the merits of such arguments, and once again, the above competitive pricing is a form of rent, they
should be directed at arguments based upon due process, rather than based upon the Commerce Clause. See also
Stearns, supra note 146, at 76 (arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not targeted against inefficient
or rent-seeking laws, but at laws that undermine the concept of political union among states).
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We could, of course, replicate the problem by moving the analysis down one more level. See supra part II.A.
(considering prisoners’ dilemma among firms in reducing outputs to raise prices). If individual firms were called upon
to implement the minimum wage or maximum hour policy, they too would find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma,
and thus require some form of regulatory intervention. The question then, addressed in the text, is whether successful
regulation requires intervention at the state or federal level.
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See supra p. 25.
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This is somewhat oversimplified. Certainly firms with a large cohort of unskilled workers will be affected more
than firms with mostly professional staffs whose salaries are already well above the minimum wage. But assuming all
states have a proportionate share of both types of firms, the burdens resulting from uniform implementation will
generally be equal among the states.
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game, given the reciprocal payoffs, the dominant outcome is mutual defection even though the
firms would be better off in a regime of mutual cooperation.
This final point requires some clarification. Some might argue that in this game the regime of
mutual defection yields higher payoffs than mutual cooperation. Otherwise, there must be some
market failure that has prevented firms, absent regulation, from implementing the preferred policy
governing working conditions. Stated differently, if in fact the firms would prefer not to abide the
minimum wage law, then mutual defection produces the optimal result.
The difficulty with this argument is that the payoffs are based on the assumption that the labor
regulations will be implemented in some fashion and thus the relative payoffs result from potential
inconsistent enforcement. Defection can take any number of forms, including articulating laws in
an ambiguous manner or announcing clear rules but declining to enforce them. If the choice is to
have inconsistent application of laws governing working conditions or laws implemented
uniformly against all firms, the payoffs in the latter regime (represented in the upper left box
depicting mutual cooperation) are superior to those in the former regime (represented in the lower
right box depicting mutual defection). Again, however, from the perspective of each individual
firm, the ideal strategy is one in which there is predicted and uniform enforcement in other states
against competitor firms, with non-enforcement or lax enforcement against themselves.
The need for central coordination here represents the obverse of the cartel game. While the
cartel game worked toward solving a coordination problem on the supply side, in Wickard the
supply of wheat, this game resolved a coordination problem on the demand side, here the demand
for laborers. As in the cartel game, mutual cooperation can only be achieved with central
coordination. And in fact, within the United States, such policies are implemented at the federal
level.189
With these two games in mind, let us now reconsider the original formulation of the substantial
effects test: “[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce,
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce.”190 Laws regulating production allocations and labor conditions both
qualify. In the absence of centrally imposed regulation, individual states would decline to adopt a
uniform system and the effect would be that individual states would have an incentive to depart
from the selected regulatory regime. The ultimate result of preventing Congressional regulation
would be to allow individual states to thwart the desired policy as a means of improving the
competitive position of their firms with respect to those in other states.191 If we assume that in the
context of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine, “economic” means having to do with
the national economy, then the coordination problem that individual states confront in
implementing these regulatory schemes explains why failing to allow Congress to regulate even
local incidents of such activity would have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.

C. Coordination in Preservation: Environmental Regulation
The final prisoners’ dilemma game involves environmental regulation. This is an especially
controversial area of Commerce Clause regulation because the various federal statutes, including
189
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most notably the Endangered Species Act,192 have been used to prevent economic development
based upon the goal of preserving the habitats of listed endangered species.193 Commentators have
lamented that to preserve endangered birds, rodents, or fish, people have been prevented from
engaging in gainful economic activity.194 Once again, the question here is not the merits of the
environmental policy. Instead, it is whether coordinated Congressional regulation is needed to
effectuate the selected policy.
Imagine that a particular species of bird, say the spotted owl, is on the endangered species list.
Also imagine that the owl is present in more than one state or that it migrates across state lines.
Assume that society wishes to preserve the owl, along with other endangered species, and seeks to
implement the scheme in a decentralized fashion. What is the likely result?
Once again, refer to the prisoners’ dilemma in Table 1.195 Assuming that the regulatory scheme
will be implemented, states receive the higher payoffs depicted in the upper left box (10, 10) if
they cooperate, thus implementing the policy uniformly as compared with mutual defection. This
not only increases the probability of preserving the endangered species, but also imposes roughly
equal burdens on in state developers who are disadvantaged by the resulting restrictions. From the
perspective of each individual state, however, the actions of other states might be necessary or
sufficient to achieving the goal of species preservation. It is possible that the species is sufficiently
scarce that unless preserved in both states, it will become extinct, but it is also possible that the
species could survive if only the other states preserved its habitat. As a result, from the perspective
of each individual state, the ideal strategy is unilateral defection (with payoffs, represented in the
upper right and lower left boxes, of 12, 5 or 5,12), which in this case means declining to adopt or
to enforce strict policies concerning endangered species, while hoping that the other state adheres
to such policies. And finally, because it is rational for each state to defect without regard to what
the other state does, the dominant outcome is mutual defection, as seen in the lower right box
(with payoffs of 7, 7).
The Ranjo Viejo v. Norton196 case, discussed at the John Roberts’ confirmation hearing,197 might
appear more difficult. In that case, a developer was prevented from undertaking a project that
threatened the arroyo toad, a species endemic to California that was listed under the Endangered
Species Act.198 While then-Judge Roberts had lamented that “The panel’s approach . . . leads to
the result that regulating the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own, lives its entire life
in California constitutes regulating ‘Commerce … among the several states,’” the preceding
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analysis helps to explain the result. Assume that several states possess endemic endangered
species. If the desired policy is to protect endangered species generally within the United States,
then applying the preceding assumptions, each individual state is motivated to relax internal
enforcement, while hoping that the remaining states enforce the endangered species preserving
law more zealously. Once again, mutual defection emerges the dominant strategy in the absence of
federal enforcement.
To be clear, it is certainly possible to imagine that the benefits of preserving the spotted owl or
the arroyo toad are sufficiently small that the costs imposed upon those who would endanger their
habitats as a result of their potentially thwarted economic development produce a net societal
benefit in doing so. There are two responses to this claim. First, whether or not this is true, and it
is certainly difficult to place meaningful values on competing claims of environment preservation
versus economic development,199 the issue once again is not whether the particular policy for
which Congress seeks to exercise its Commerce Clause power is welfare enhancing. Instead,
assuming that the policy will be implemented, the question is which level of enforcement is
required. The game theoretical model, once again, explains the need for federal enforcement.
In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, one can argue that state policies that threaten
to balkanize markets or to otherwise disrupt the flow of commerce,200 justify federal judicial
intervention on the ground that such intervention is welfare enhancing.201 In this context, however,
we are not calling upon the federal judiciary to effectuate policies associated with the Commerce
Clause against contrary state laws. Instead, recognizing that the Commerce Clause is first and
foremost a delegation of authority to Congress, the question is what types of regulatory policies
require centralized coordination for their implementation and enforcement. To engage in such an
analysis, we begin by assuming the objectives of the selected policy, or perhaps more precisely,
leaving challenges to the substantive merits of the policy to other, more appropriate, constitutional
bases.202 Only then can we evaluate whether the policy can be implemented in a decentralized
fashion or whether, instead, it requires centralized implementation.
Some scholars might dispute the wisdom of each of the sets of policies described thus far, price
fixing, labor regulations, and environmental controls, or at least the selected level of enforcement.
But the question as to the wisdom of these policies, or the appropriate enforcement level, is
separate from the question whether structural impediments reflected in the prisoners’ dilemma
prevent the affected firms or states from implementing them absent central coordinated
intervention. The analysis in this part demonstrates that with respect to these three sets of policies,
the states are in a prisoners’ dilemma justifying federal regulation because the underlying activity
has a substantial economic effect on commerce respecting that policy’s implementation.
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D. Geographical Barriers to Interstate Coordination
The final coordination problem involving Congress’s Commerce Clause power involves a
different analytical game. Successful business ventures often depend upon coordination among
separate political or geographical entities, which operate at the same hierarchical level, but which
answer to different constituencies.203 Interstate railroads require cooperation among states to lay
tracks and to transport cars and materials, and trucks engaged in interstate shipping require
agreements on licensing and regulatory controls.204 If each state were permitted to depart from
generally accepted requirements governing emissions, permissible truck weight or length,
structural safety features, or even the shape of mud flaps, the resulting regime would threaten to
raise the costs of commerce sufficiently as to turn states into balkanized trade zones.
Notably, such barriers can arise not only in the context of federal legislation, but also when a
single state thwarts a regime adopted by other states.205 This helps to explain some of the more
anomalous dormant Commerce Clause cases associated with state highway safety regulations that
although falling within the traditional sphere of state police powers, nonetheless thwart a benign
coordinated scheme operating among surrounding states.206 One unique feature of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is that unlike most other constitutional rules, Congress can overturn
the Supreme Court’s decisions with ordinary legislation.207 The problem of interstate coordination
provides a simple account of this doctrinal feature and helps to explain this final category of
Congressional Commerce Clause powers.208
In the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause, states sometimes find themselves in a multiple
Nash equilibrium bargaining game.209 This game, as illustrated in Table 2, is noticeably different
from the prisoners’ dilemma. The paradigmatic illustration of multiple Nash equilibria involves
driving. As indicated by the difference between the British and United States driving regimes, a
functional driving infrastructure can operate when vehicles drive either on the left or on the right
203
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side of the road. Neither regime is superior to the other, but either is superior to the absence of a
clear and agreed upon regime that dictates left or right driving.
Imagine two drivers who have acquired vehicles at the inception of automobiles, and thus before
the imposition of any regulatory regime governing right or left driving. As shown in Table 2, the
drivers receive a maximum payoff (10, 10) if they agree to a common driving regime, whether
(left, left) or (right, right). In contrast, if the drivers are unwilling or unable to settle upon a
coordinated driving regime and instead select opposite regimes (left, right or right, left), the result
is a “mixed strategy equilibrium,” which yields dramatically lower payoffs (0, 0).
Table 2: Multiple Nash Equilibrium Bargaining Game
Payoffs for (A, B)

A Drives Right

A Drives Left

B Drives Right

(10, 10)

(0, 0)

B Drives Left

(0, 0)

(10, 10)

While the prisoners’ dilemma game conduces to a unique equilibrium outcome of mutual
defection, this Nash equilibrium game instead suggests two preferred equilibrium strategies
represented in the upper left and lower right boxes. If Driver A drives right, then Driver B can
increase her potential payoff from 0 to 10 by also driving right, and if Driver A drives left, then
Driver B can increase her potential payoff from 0 to 10 by also driving left. The payoffs are
reciprocal and so Driver A has the same incentive to align his strategy with the strategy selected
by Driver B.
This is not to suggest that the preferred arrangement invariably obtains in a multiple Nash
equilibrium bargaining game.210 If for example the two drivers tried in good faith to anticipate the
other’s preferred driving regime but got it wrong, then the result would be a mixed strategy
equilibrium with mutually low payoffs and potentially deadly consequences.
In the context of interstate commerce, most states are also in a game in which they benefit from
common driving regimes. As each state adopts a particular regime, say driving on the right, the
marginal returns increase as other states follow the same course.211 In addition, unlike two drivers
simultaneously guessing at each other’s preferences, the probability of absolutely simultaneous
decision making among states is unlikely, and thus the prospect of mixed strategy equilibrium
outcomes is diminished.212 And yet, states sometimes enact regulatory policies that thwart
commonly accepted regimes that facilitate the flow of commerce.
In the driving game, this could arise if the one state chose left after the surrounding states had
chosen right.213 More typically, the problem arises when, for example, a group of states permits a
certain rig formation to travel in commerce, but one state in the middle elects instead to ban it, or
210
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when a group of states employs a common mudflap and one state in the middle instead insists
upon an alternative mudflap. In two such cases, Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,214 and
Bibb v. Illinois,215 the Supreme Court’s decisions to strike state laws that were out of keeping with
the dominant laws of the surrounding states suggest that the defecting states perceived a benefit
from attempting to thwart what would otherwise have been a simple multiple Nash equilibrium
game.216 In each case, the Court struck down the challenged contrary state laws, evincing a
concern that the state enacting or maintaining it was not motivated by the law’s superiority as a
safety measure as compared with those of the surrounding states, but rather was attempting to
secure the benefits of the surrounding states’ pro-commerce coordinated activity, without
incurring its fair share of the cost.217
When an individual state thwarts the dominant regime of the surrounding states, those burdened
by the outlier regime will sometimes, as in Kassel and Bibb, challenge the minority rule based
upon the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The federal courts have blunt tools in dealing with
such cases, allowing them to strike or sustain the challenged law.218 In contrast, Congress has
more subtle tools at its disposal. Congress can, for example, implement a new scheme on its own
or make the minority rule dominant should it find that rule superior.219
Congress not only has greater flexibility than does the Supreme Court in selecting remedies to
solve problems of interstate coordination, but also it has broader flexibility in selecting among
normative objectives associated with the implementation of its Commerce Clause authority. Thus,
for example, the Supreme Court has allowed Congress, using its Commerce Clause powers, to
further objectives associated with race, and specifically with access to places of public
accommodation.220 The difficulties in implementing such policies are similar to those associated
with a state thwarting the benign outcome of a multiple Nash equilibrium game.
Imagine a group of states that permits places of public accommodation to segregate or to decline
service altogether based upon race. Now imagine that society has decided to implement a regime
change that would prevent this continued set of discriminatory practices, not only because such
discrimination is morally repugnant, but also to ensure that racial minorities are not inhibited from
engaging in interstate travel by the inconvenience associated with scarce or shoddy hotel and

214

450 U.S. 662 (1981).
359 U.S. 520 (1959).
216
See Stearns, supra note 146, at 130-33 (explaining cases based upon multiple Nash equilibrium game).
217
In Kassel, most notably, the exceptions to the ban on 65-foot twin trailers strongly suggested that Iowa benefited
from the flow of commerce to Iowa, but elected not to be a thruway for commerce from point to point outside Iowa.
This intuition is strengthened by the Governor’s statement in support of his vetoing a bill that would have relaxed
restrictions on the intra-state shipment of mobile homes. As Justice Powell, writing for the plurality explained:
Governor Ray commented, in his veto message:
"This bill . . . would make Iowa a bridge state as these oversized units are moved into Iowa
after being manufactured in another state and sold in a third. None of this activity would be
of particular economic benefit to Iowa."
215

Kassel, 450 U.S. at 666 n.7 (quoting Governor's Veto Message of March 16, 1972).
218
See Stearns, supra note 146, at 133-36 (explaining judicial limitations in Dormant Commerce Clause cases).
219
See id.
220
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (sustaining public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Commerce Clause challenge as applied to a motel); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (sustaining same provisions against a Commerce Clause challenge as applied to a
restaurant).

37

restaurant accommodations.221 As in the prior coordination games the question arises whether the
states, operating in a decentralized manner, could implement the regime change, or whether
instead, they require Congress, using its central regulatory enforcement power, to act on their
behalf.
Assume that all or almost all of the relevant states agree to the liberalized public
accommodations policy that promotes the ability of African Americans to travel freely throughout
the United States, and that they have declared illegal any practice that denied access to places of
public accommodation based upon race or ethnicity. The difficulty is that these state practices are
not alone sufficient to ensure the desired result. Even a single recalcitrant state in the middle of a
group of surrounding states could thwart the scheme by declining to adopt the liberalized rule,
once again explaining the benefits of central coordination in implementing the desired public
accommodations regime.

E. Policies Not Requiring Central Coordinated Intervention
We have now applied two coordination games to four paradigmatic cases that require federal
intervention to implement a desired policy affecting interstate commerce. Completing the model,
however, requires a final step. We need to identify a paradigm case that implicates neither model
and that fits none of the four paradigms requiring coordinated central intervention to facilitate the
desired policy.
Let us reconsider Lopez v. United States.222 In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the GunFree School Zones Act.223 The statute prohibited persons from carrying or using weapons within a
1000 foot radius of a school. Certainly the policy is normatively appealing. Few would argue
against banning the carrying and use of guns near schools.224 As before, however, the question is
not the wisdom of the selected policy; rather, it is whether implementing the policy requires
central coordination. And here the answer is no.
To understand why, imagine that State A elects to enact a similar law that prohibits the
possession and use of guns within a specified radius of its schools. The question is whether the
decision of neighboring State B not to enact the same law undermines the selected policy in state
A. If instead, State B targets the offensive conduct without classifying gun-related crimes
committed on school property as a separate offense, but rather by enhancing penalties for any
crime with or without a gun committed on school premises, this would have no effect on the
particular method of targeting the same conduct in State A. Indeed, if State B treated gun-related
crimes on school grounds no differently than other gun-related crimes committed elsewhere, that
would have no effect on the policy selected in State A.
There is no prisoners’ dilemma game that would result in States A and B defecting from a
regime in which, through whatever means they happen to prefer, the states punish various crimes
on school grounds. And the decision of State B to select a different means of targeting that
221
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conduct, or even to decline to target the conduct separately, in no sense blocks any geographically
coordinated pro-commerce strategy among states. In short, Lopez implicates neither model
justifying the use of central authority to ensure that the selected policy is not undermined by the
decisions of states as a whole to defect or by the decisions of a single state to undermine the
selected coordinated strategy.
We have now completed the analytical model with respect to the Supreme Court’s major
commerce clause cases, including the most recent precedent, Gonzales v. Raich.225 The analysis
demonstrates the power of the preceding analysis to reconcile the major post-New Deal expansion
of Commerce Clause power with the retrenchments represented in Lopez and Morrison. I do not
wish to suggest that there are no hard cases arising under the Commerce Clause.226 But addressing
even the most difficult Commerce Clause cases is easier if the Court’s analysis is informed by a
better set of analytical tools.227

III.

A Closer Look at the Commerce Clause Cases

In this part, we will briefly consider several prominent Commerce Clause cases that help test the
coordination theory of Congress’s Commerce Clause power described in part II. While the review
is not comprehensive, together with the cases used to develop the model in part II, the discussion
provides the basis for assessing the game theoretical model of the Commerce Clause, including
completing the analysis of Gonzales v. Raich.228

A. A Comment on the Least Controversial Commerce Clause
Categories:
Channels
of
Interstate
Commerce,
and
Instrumentalities, and Persons and Things Traveling in Interstate
Commerce
While this article has focused primarily on the substantial effects category of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power, which encompasses Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, and most recently
Raich, the game theoretical model developed in part II helps to assess the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power more broadly. As a result, it is important to consider the remaining, and
less controversial, doctrinal categories based upon that model.
To assess Congress’s power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, and
instrumentalities, and persons and things traveling in interstate commerce, it is helpful to relate
those doctrinal categories to the dormant side of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Although not without exception,229 the Dormant Commerce Clause cases generally
involve state laws that infringe on commerce by closing access to interstate commerce directly,230
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for example by granting an exclusive license to use a channel of interstate commerce to the
exclusion of potential interstate competitors,231 or indirectly, by imposing restrictions on
permissible instrumentalities of commerce that are out of keeping with the general requirements
accepted in other states.232
The doctrinal connection between the two sides of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which affords Congress the power to regulate in areas where states have
traditionally interfered with commerce, should not be surprising. Among the principal objectives
animating the Commerce Clause, and indeed animating the replacement of the Articles of
Confederation with the Constitution itself, was preventing state laws that undermine the concept
of political union among states.233 Whether the vehicle for implementing this objective is a judicial
decision that invalidates a challenged state law alleged to infringe on commerce or a
Congressional statute that ensures a uniform policy with respect to that subject area, the effect is to
ensure that the difficulties associated with decentralized decision making among individual states
do not thwart the framers’ desired objective of unifying the United States into a single entity with
respect to commerce by instead allowing them to fracture into balkanized trade zones.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the facts underlying Gibbons v. Ogden,234 the
landmark Supreme Court case concerning the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power,
implicate both the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. New York had granted
an exclusive license to Fulton and Livingston, who granted it to Ogden, to operate a steamboat
ferry between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Gibbons operated a competing
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ferry pursuant to a federal law authorizing him to operate a vessel in the “coasting trade.”235 While
Gibbons’s ferry, an instrumentality of commerce, operated pursuant to a federal statute, the
exclusive New York license under which Ogden operated effectively blocked a channel of
interstate commerce.
In sustaining the federal law, and thus the scope of Congress’s regulatory power under the
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court recognized, at least implicitly, the risks associated with
decentralized regulation of the channels of interstate commerce.236 If Congress were not permitted
to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, and thus to remove geographical obstructions to
the flow of interstate commerce, then open channels of commerce would depend entirely upon the
fortuity of coordinated state laws, which as Gibbons itself illustrated, was not always forthcoming.
Cases involving the regulation of channels and instrumentalities of commerce are easily
explained based upon the intuition that underlies the multiple Nash equilibrium game. Allowing
states to enact laws that undermine geographical coordination among states would obviously
prevent the flow of commerce among states. In such Dormant Commerce Clause as Kassel and
Bibb, individual state defection from a coordinated pro-commerce regime arises simply by the
decision of a single state to enact or maintain a law contrary to that in surrounding states, even if
that law is not the product of a superior policy. While Kassel and Bibb arose on the dormant side
of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the clause itself is a delegation of
regulatory power to Congress.
Congress’s power with respect to the Commerce Clause surpasses that of the federal judiciary in
several significant respects. Congress need not await a case presenting a challenge to a nonconforming law.237 It can instead anticipate a potential conflict by electing to regulate channels or
instrumentalities of commerce directly. And when the Supreme Court, for example, strikes a state
law down under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, Congress can supercede that ruling
through ordinary legislation that either facilitates a mixed strategy equilibrium, thus permitting
states to embrace different regimes,238 or by making the rejected minority position mandatory
among states.239
The multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining model also explains why, unlike with constitutional
rulings generally, Congress can override Dormant Commerce Clause decisions through ordinary
legislation.240 Most state laws that result in coordinated pro-commerce strategies are not enacted
235
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simultaneously. States enact laws aware of how they will relate to those of surrounding states. The
consequence of sequential decision making, however, is to render state laws dependent upon the
order or path of state decision making.241 The resulting path dependence implies that the laws
selected in the earliest moving states have an advantage relative to contrary laws enacted later in
other states.242
Because state laws affecting commerce are potentially prone to path dependence, there is a risk
that the regime that emerges as dominant, even if once viewed as a pure matter of interstate
coordination, produced a policy that over time proved inferior to an available alternative
regime.243 If the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause rulings were like ordinary
constitutional rulings, requiring a constitutional amendment or overruling to replace, then the
result would be to entrench regulatory regimes that are the product of fortuitous timing among
individual states rather than an assessment of their merit as compared with other potential regimes.
We have now demonstrated how the coordination analysis in part II explains the easiest
categories of Commerce Clause cases. We now turn to the final, and most controversial category,
in which Congress regulates local activity that exhibits a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

B. Substantial Effects Cases
This final category has been most recently transformed as part of the Supreme Court’s new
commerce clause doctrine and is critical to assessing the major cases under review, Wickard,
Lopez, and Raich. Most recently, the Raich Court relied upon the revised doctrine to sustain the
application of the CSA to respondents’ activities in producing, acquiring, and using medical
marijuana. Because the Raich Court determined that Wickard, a case implicating the cartel game,
was strikingly similar, and ultimately controlling, we will leave that paradigm until the end. We
will now employ the game theoretical analysis of the commerce clause developed in the prior part
to consider several major cases and doctrinal categories that justify coordinated federal
intervention.

1. Wage and Hour Regulations
The landmark New Deal legislation did not regulate channels or instrumentalities of commerce,
but rather regulated conditions of employment directly or things traveling in commerce as an
indirect means of regulating conditions of employment. As a result, to sustain such regulation, the
Supreme Court needed a new paradigm for evaluating the permissible scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers. Such regulations took various forms. The National Labor Relations
Act,244 sustained in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,245 created a comprehensive regime
governing labor-management relations, including the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively. The Fair Labor Standards Act,246 sustained in United States v. Darby,247 prohibited
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the interstate shipment of goods that were manufactured by employees who earned below the
specified minimum wage or who worked beyond the specified maximum number of hours.248
As before, the issue considered here is not the normative merit of collective bargaining
agreements or of minimum wage or maximum hour laws. Instead, the question is whether the
Supreme Court decisions sustaining these labor laws are consistent with the insight that the scope
of Congress’s Commerce Clause power is linked to the need for a central coordinating authority to
implement selected regulatory schemes. In these two cases, the answer is yes.
Darby follows simply from the model presented in part II.B. Firms and states confront a
prisoners’ dilemma in seeking to implement minimum wage or maximum hours schemes thus
requiring a centrally imposed federal solution. The more difficult case is Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. Collective bargaining allows employees to cartelize their wages, thus setting a rate that
exceeds what they would obtain under ordinary market conditions.249 While the results of
individual collective bargaining contracts will not be uniform among firms subject to the NLRA,
states nonetheless remain in a prisoners’ dilemma in seeking to implement a policy that facilitates
collective bargaining. From the perspective of individual firms, operating in a collective
bargaining environment imposes higher labor costs relative to firms not subject to such
requirements. It is therefore rational for each firm or state to prefer imposing the burden of
collective bargaining on other firms or states while declining to impose the obligation on
themselves. It is not surprising therefore that the regime facilitating collective bargaining arises at
the federal, rather than state, level.250

2. Environmental Coordination
The model in part II explained the need for central coordination in environmental conservation
policies. In this part, we focus a discrete aspect of environmental coordination, namely waste
disposal. This area of law is important not only because it is ubiquitous,251 but also because it
shows that superadditive gains can arise with moves either in the direction of central or
decentralized decision making. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not facilitated an optimal set
of doctrines to encourage the creation of much needed waste disposal facilities because it has
treated waste in much the same manner as other categories of commerce without considering
which regime produces the largest superadditive gains. To understand the coordination problem
that arises in the context of waste disposal, it is helpful to contrast two cases, one arising on each
side of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
247
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In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,252 the Supreme Court stuck down a New Jersey statute
that banned the import of solid or liquid waste originating from out of state.253 After determining
that its negative value notwithstanding, waste was an article in commerce,254 the Court determined
that states could not discriminate against waste originating from other states in an effort to prolong
the life of their landfills.255 The Court determined that states could further their environmental
interests, or even their residents’ financial interests implicated by the threat of closing their waste
disposal facilities,256 but only through commerce-neutral means.257
As then-Associate Justice Rehnquist observed in a dissenting opinion, the difficulty with the
City of Philadelphia ruling is that it imposes a Hobson’s choice upon states, which must either
regulate waste commerce neutrally or not at all. One might respond that imposing such a choice is
the very point of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. But consider whether in this context an
insistently commerce-neutral regime is necessarily welfare-enhancing. By preventing states from
capturing the benefit of their own waste disposal, states lose the incentive to grant the necessary
permits to facilitate the creation of waste disposal facilities.258 In a perfect world, Philadelphia,
because it is across the river from New Jersey, would be permitted to dispose of its waste at an
appropriate site in southern New Jersey if doing so was less costly than disposing of its waste at a
more distant site in Pennsylvania. But for this first-best solution to work, New Jersey must be
motivated to facilitate the creation of the needed waste outlet. If the choice is a shortage of
facilities, but treating waste from Philadelphia the same as waste from Camden, versus
encouraging the creation of facilities, but forcing waste from Philadelphia to travel a greater
distance within Pennsylvania, the latter option might well be superior. While this, of course, is a
second-best theory, comparative institutional analysis depends upon avoiding the critical error of
making the perfect the enemy of the good.259
Another option, of course, would be to have Congress direct states to create needed waste
disposal facilities. This implicates the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and, once
again, the Supreme Court has failed adequately to consider the relative merit of two admittedly
imperfect alternative regimes. In the context of low-level radioactive waste, the Supreme Court
has relied upon the anti-commandeering doctrine to prevent Congress from insisting that states
create the needed disposal facilities. In New York v. United States,260 the Supreme Court struck
down the take-title provisions of the Low-Level Waste Policy Amendments of 1985.261 The
complicated statutory scheme contained a series of incentives designed to motivate states to
develop a coordinated solution to the looming crisis concerning disposal of low-level radio active
waste.262 While the United States once had three disposal facilities, at the time that the
252
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amendments were enacted, there was only a single facility and the Governor of South Carolina,
where the site was located, had threatened to reduce intake by 50%.263
The federal scheme, which required that each state become self sufficient in low level waste
management by either creating its own disposal facility or by joining a regional pact with other
states, contained three sets of incentives.264 Only the third, the take-title provision, created a
Commerce Clause problem.265
Congress demanded non-complying states to either take title to their producers’ waste or
reimburse producers for their failure to do so.266 The Court struck this down on the ground that
Congress lacks the power to commandeer state legislatures, meaning to force them to pass laws
that implement Congress’s chosen regulatory policy, as opposed to having Congress regulate
private entities on its own.267 The purpose here is not to evaluate the merits of the Court’s
historical argument that the Constitution prevents Congress from commandeering state
legislatures.268 Rather, it is to demonstrate that the Court has thwarted two possible second-best
regimes, either of which would suffice to facilitate the development of a pro-commerce strategy
respecting waste disposal. First, the Court could allow states to balkanize, thus encouraging states
to become self sufficient by letting them capture the benefit of their approved facilities. Or second,
if the Court insists as part of its Dormant Commerce Clause analysis upon commerce-neutral state
waste regulation, it can afford Congress the flexibility denied under the anti-commandeering
doctrine to coerce states as needed to force the creation of waste disposal facilities when allowing
discrimination in commerce is not alone sufficient.269

3. Geographic coordination
The most recent major case testing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to further the
goal of geographic coordination is Morrison v. United States,270 the second case after Lopez to
strike a federal statute under the non-economic activities test. Because this case bears some
similarities to two prominent civil rights cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,271 and
Katzenbach v. McClung,272 it is important to compare these cases.
263
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In Heart of Atlanta Motel,273 the Supreme Court upheld the application of the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964274 to a motel located in Atlanta,
Georgia that was readily accessible to two interstate and two state highways, that advertised on
billboards along those highways, and that did 75% of its business with out-of-state guests.275 In the
companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung,276 the Court denied a request to enjoin the application of
the same statute to Ollie’s Barbeque, a family owned restaurant located in Birmingham,
Alabama,277 that received in one year about $150,000 in food from a vendor who purchased a
substantial portion in interstate commerce, and that was located eleven blocks from an interstate
highway.278
To avoid the state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
rested its rulings sustaining both laws on the Commerce Clause.279 Thus, the issue in these cases
was whether Congress could rely upon its Commerce Clause power to prohibit private persons
who owned or operated places of public accommodation from engaging in various forms of racial
discrimination. In both cases, Justice Clark, writing for a majority, noted the serious difficulties
that African Americans had confronted as a result of discriminatory practices operating throughout
the South in traveling that region of the United States.280 And yet, in both cases, Justice Clark
justified Congress’s exercise of Commerce Clause power on the proximity to channels of
interstate commerce or on the likely linkage to persons or goods traveling in commerce. Thus, in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Clark focused on the proximity of the Motel to interstate highways,281 and
in Katzenbach, Clark focused on the wholesale vendor’s purchase of interstate supplies.282
The coordination game presented in part II provides a more intuitive linkage from the regulated
activity and the objectives of interstate commerce than the fortuity that the particular place of
public accommodation was located near a highway or purchased supplies beyond some minimal
threshold level that traveled in interstate commerce. To implement Congress’s desired federal
scheme effectuating the ability of persons to travel in commerce without regard to race, it was
essential to do so centrally. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Justice Clark noted that 32 states had public
accommodations laws similar to that at issue in the case.283 While the states that failed to afford
such protections were generally geographically contained, Congress could intuit that the ability to
liberalize this policy and thus to ensure free travel by African Americans throughout the United
States depended on the willingness of individual states to regulate resistant places of public
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accommodation. The inability to rely upon states to ensure this result (18 states did not go along),
certainly explains the need for central coordinated intervention.
Once we recognize the policy of ensuring free travel, including access to places of public
accommodation without regard to race, we can see that even a single recalcitrant state, or a group
of such states, could inhibit the implementation of that policy by other states. The analytical
problem justifying central coordination is in effect the same as when as a single state blocks
commerce in a multiple Nash equilibrium game by enacting a law that thwarts the dominant
regime in surrounding states.
In Morrison v. United States,284 the most recent case striking down an exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power, the Supreme Court invalidated the civil remedies provision for violent
gender-related crimes in the Violence Against Women Act,285 as a Commerce Clause violation.286
The Morrison Court applied the Lopez non-economic activities test to hold that violence against
women was not an economic activity, and thus did not qualify under the substantial effects test for
Congressional Commerce Clause powers.287
As in Heart of Atlanta Hotel and Katzenbach, Morrison did not involve the regulation of
persons traveling in interstate commerce directly. Certainly no state banned women, or women
from other states, from traveling within their borders. The question instead was whether Congress
could effect a supplemental federal civil remedy for what was already a state law crime in virtually
every jurisdiction when that criminal activity was gender motivated. Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected a line of reasoning, based upon Congressional findings that linked the burdens of gendermotivated violence to a diminution in travel and thus a reduction in business, and thus an effect on
interstate commercial activity.288 Rehnquist determined that taking this but-for causal reasoning to
its logical extreme would allow Congress to regulate in such traditional state areas as family law,
marriage, divorce, and childrearing.289
At one level, Morrison appears to implicate the structural issues associated with geographical
coordination raised in Heart of Atlanta Hotel and Katzenbach. If states had not uniformly
284
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criminalized and enforced laws against gender motivated crime, the result could be balkanized
travel in which women based their decisions on the criminal statutes of individual states. Even if
all states agreed to the policy of ensuring free travel without regard to gender, in theory
effectuating the policy might require uniform implementation because of the threat that one state
could reverse course. But in this case, it appears that the Supreme Court found this insufficiently
plausible to justify VAWA. The Court apparently intuited instead that the historical context of
state laws that resulted in impediments to interstate travel by African Americans did not have a
strong analogue with respect to gender. This is an admittedly hard case because the game
theoretical intuitions affecting African Americans and women are similar, even if the Court
intuited that the historical records concerning the specific question of burdens on interstate travel
justified different results.

4. Noncoordination cases
Before proceeding to Raich, we will consider one final, and also difficult, case. In Perez v.
United States,290 the Supreme Court sustained the exercise of Commerce Clause power, but in a
context in which the coordination analysis makes this determination at least potentially
problematic. After Perez, we will revisit Raich, in light of the preceding analysis, which
demonstrates why preventing the state-approved use of medical marijuana was not justified to
effectuate a coordinated federal regulatory scheme.

a) Perez
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In Perez, the Supreme Court sustained the application of Title II of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act,292 which prohibited, among other activities, “extortionate credit transactions,”293
against a man convicted of loan sharking in connection with organized crime. The Perez Court
sustained the Act as applied to petitioner on the ground that even if the particular incident of
activity was local, the larger class of organized crime affected interstate commerce.294
The apparent difficulty, as Justice Stewart noted in dissent, is that the nature of organized crime
is no different from crimes that are the subject of state criminal laws in general.295 As a result,
Stewart claimed, sustaining the law as applied to petitioner’s activities threatened to confer the
equivalent of state police powers upon Congress.296 In one sense, this critique of Perez finds
support in the recent holdings in Lopez and Morrison, both of which curtailed Congress’s
Commerce Clause power in areas that overlapped with state criminal laws. These recent
precedents, therefore, might be read to cut back at the edges of Perez.
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There is, however, a plausible theory under which the statute at issue in Perez is justified under
a coordination analysis in a manner that these more recent cases are not. Extortionate credit
practices in many parts of the United States are connected with organized criminal activity that
crosses state lines. Organized crime in New York extends to, or is at least connected with,
organized crime in Connecticut and New Jersey. The coordination problem involves state and
local prosecutors who might resist information sharing and other forms of cooperation that could
result in successful convictions in high profile cases against criminals whose harmful activity was
experienced locally.
Referring once again to the prisoners’ dilemma presented in Table 1,297 from the perspective of
the fight against organized crime, each individual state would receive a relatively high payoff by
cooperating with the other state. And yet, from the perspective of each individual state, the ideal
solution is to enjoy the benefits of the other state’s cooperation while jealously guarding
information gathered in the course of the underlying criminal investigation. Because it is rational
for each state to defect from a cooperative strategy without regard to what the other state does, the
result is mutual defection, depicted in the lower right box, even though each state would receive
higher payoffs with mutual cooperation.
By raising the criminal enforcement action to the federal level, the states are effectively forced
to share information, thus generating the equivalent of mutual cooperation, even though the
ultimate enforcement authority will be the federal, rather than the state, prosecutors. This game
simply has no counterpart on the facts of either Lopez or Morrison. Isolated street crimes that take
place at or near schools, or random acts of violence against women, do not create the sort of
coordinated law enforcement problem associated with information sharing that is at least
potentially relevant in the context of organized crime. As stated previously, given the overlap with
traditional state police powers, Perez remains a difficult case. At a minimum, there is a plausible
coordination rationale for distinguishing Perez from the recent cases retrenching on Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers. We are now ready to return to Gonzales v. Raich.

b) Raich Revisited
The preceding analysis developed four paradigmatic cases from two game theoretical models,
which demonstrate the circumstances under which central coordinated authority is needed to
implement a selected policy. Congressional regulatory intervention does not require proof that
structural coordination problems of the sort described in part II would actually emerge if the states
were left to regulate the matter on their own. Such an exacting standard would be impossible to
maintain.298 When the structural markers for a coordination difficulty are identified, the burden
should fall upon those seeking to limit Congressional power, not the other way around.
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It is easy to see that none of the coordination games previously identified apply to Raich.299
Selecting any particular game to focus on, here the game involving supply side coordination as a
means of raising prices, is arbitrary in a certain sense. Still the game at issue in Wickard is
important if for no other reason than that the Raich majority found the two cases strikingly
similar.300 To demonstrate that they are actually quite dissimilar, let us consider what Congress set
out to achieve in the schedule I marijuana classification in the CSA. The classification was
intended to further two objectives, first to ban illicit marijuana use, and second, to ensure that
marijuana, which like wheat is fungible is not moved from legitimate to illicit channels.301
Defining these legislative goals precisely is important. If the goal instead were defined as
ensuring that no one uses marijuana, even if permitted under state law and on advice of a
physician to relieve intense pain or other symptoms for which traditional medications fail to
provide relief, then an absolute ban would be essential to furthering the scheme. But this is
entirely circular.302 Notice, for example, that in Wickard, the Court did not justify its application of
the ban to Filburn on the circular logic that the scheme was intended to prevent violations of
quotas even by particular local farmers like Filburn.303 Rather, Justice Jackson suggested that
imposing the burden on Filburn was somehow linked to furthering the larger legislative scheme.
As shown in part II, individual states would confront a structural impediment to implementing
coordinated output reduction as a means of securing non-competitive prices. While a centrally
coordinated scheme is therefore justified in implementing this selected policy, however, it is not
sufficient. Adopting the scheme but failing to signal the level at which it will be enforced will
result in an erosion of the scheme. Since home grown wheat accounted for 20 % of the variance in
the market, Justice Jackson evaluated the impact of declining to honor the government’s selected
penalty on others similarly situated.
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The policy of preventing illicit use and illicit diversion of marijuana does not possess the sort of
structural impediments to decentralized implementation at issue in Wickard.304 Some states might
be skeptical concerning the benefits of marijuana as a treatment for pain and nausea, while other
states might take a more liberal view. But the decision of one state to implement a more liberal
scheme on this narrow policy in no sense prevents another state from declining to do so.
There is undoubtedly a risk of some seepage from the protected medical marijuana market to the
illicit drug market.305 But this only underscores the analysis. Recall that the original Wickard
formulation demanded a “substantial economic effect” on commerce.306 An effect that is not both
“substantial” and “economic” will not do.307 The structural problem justifying central coordinated
intervention in cartel enforcement arises because the failure to implement that policy at the federal
level will have a substantial effect in thwarting the policy and because the effect will result in a
change in the resulting economic conditions in a manner that affects interstate commerce. Absent
central implementation and enforcement, the cartel would threaten to break down. In Raich,
however, a contrary ruling allowing those who are permitted under state law, with their
physician’s prescription, to use medical marijuana would have no such effect. Instead, it simply
denied relief—at least by lawful means—to two women seeking relief for their pain and suffering.

Conclusion
While this Article has criticized particular doctrinal formulations and applications under the
Commerce Clause, and in particular the Lopez formulation of the non-economic activities test and
the application of that test in Raich, its larger purpose goes beyond any particular case. The central
goal has been to construct a new methodology for assessing the Commerce Clause—one grounded
in the need for a central coordinating authority to implement the selected policy that has a
substantial affect on interstate commerce—that can be practically applied in actual cases.
The Commerce Clause is important because as shown in such cases as Katzenbach v.
McClung,308 and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,309 absent a more specific delegation,
Congress will naturally gravitate toward the most open ended source power to effectuate
normative objectives it deems important. At the same time, however, our federal Constitution,
unlike its state counterparts, does not rest on a model of plenary or presumed powers. The
normative framework developed in this Article satisfies the admonition most compellingly
expressed by now retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor that the Commerce Clause doctrine must
ensure that Congress has the power to “regulate more than nothing . . . and less than
304
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everything.”310 A methodology that meets these objectives should appeal not only to those who
study constitutional law, but also and more importantly to the sitting members of the Roberts
Court.
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